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ABSTRACT
Russia has desired a foothold in the Middle East since
the time of Peter the Great. Russia wanted access to the
Middle East for both military and commercial reasons. This
foreign policy objective met with varying degrees of success
until the mid 1950 's when it appeared that the Soviet Union
finally had her entry into the Middle East. After the
Egyptian revolt of 1952 the new government turned to the
West and the United States for aid and arms, Egypt was turned
down repeatedly. Egypt then turned to the USSR. By 19 57
Russia had the Mid East presence she so long desired. The
Soviet influence in Egypt grew to enormous proportions through-
out the Nasser years. After Nasser's death in 1970 it appeared
that the same strong relationship would continue between
Egypt and the Soviet Union, but that was not to be. Russia
had failed to understand the Egyptian people and the Egyptian
government and had failed to deliver the kind of arms and
aid that Sadat requested. In 19 72 Sadat expelled most of the
Russian advisors and technicians and the relationship began
a steady decline until the spring of 19 76 when there was a
virtual break between the Egypticins and the Russians. Now
(after 1975) Egypt has turned to the West once again. The
United States has an opportunity to regain valuable lost
ground in Egypt and the Middle East. The US must learn from
the lessons of the recent past and deal pragmatically with
Egypt's requests for arms and aid in order to re-establish
lost American influence and prestige in Egypt.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We have an opportunity unique in the history of Inter-
national Relations; that is, an opportunity to study, examine,
cind analyze the relationship between two sovereign nations
from the inception to the demise. This particular relation-
ship is, of course, the one between the Soviet Union and
Egypt.
There is no do\±>t that the relationship between these
two major international actors climbed from one of simple
diplomatic courtesy and representation, to one of great
stature and involvement between the nations, and then fell
back to its original status of courteous, if not cold,
diplomatic representation.
This entire chapter of Egyptian-Soviet history was
written in less than twenty five years. International
relationships of this magnitude and consequence usually need
decades to evolve and mature and then wither — if that is
their destiny. Here is a case that cannot be brushed aside
as historical accident, or disregarded as an isolated
example not likely to occur again. There are questions
that must be answered if policy and decision makers hope
to be effective in foreign relations and avoid the failures
that the Soviet Union suffered in Egypt.
This paper will ask and answer such questions as: "How
did the West, principally the United States, fail to gain

any position of influence in Egypt after the 19 5 2 revolu-
tion?"; "What were the factors and circumstances that
caused Egypt to turn to the Soviet Union for aid and advice?";
"How and why did the Soviets gain such a position of pre-
eminence in Egypt in a relatively short period of time?";
"How did the Russians manage to negate their efforts and
loose their position of influence in Egypt?"; "Is there a
chance that the United States, or any other nation, can fill
the void left by the Soviets in Egypt?"; and finally, "Is
this case an isolated instance in international relations
or can this phenomenon occur again, specifically in the
Middle East?"
The purpose of this paper is to trace the rise and fall
of the Soviet Union in Egypt from an Egyptian perspective.
It will however, include references to, and analyses of,
the relationships between Egypt and the other major powers
that helped shape the Egyptian-Soviet Relationship. Speci-
fically, the paper will examine why the United States,
Britain, and France (the West) lost the opportunity for a
meaningful relationship with Egypt, and whether or not a
relationship can now be developed between Egypt and the
West.
In the course of examining the Egyptian-Soviet relation-
ship one must look at the military, political, economic,
cultural, strategic, and diplomatic aspects of the alliance.
In order to handle so large a volume of information it is

necessary to arrange the material chronologically. The
paper will begin with the earliest known interests of the
Russians in the Middle East, and then proceed through the
pre-Nasser, Nasser, and Sadat eras. The individual conclu-
sions in each chapter will be suimnarized at the end of the
paper and these factors or conclusions will be used to gain
some insight into Egypt's future in the international
community.
This study should prove useful from several points of
view. It should help the reader to understand: 1 - Egypt,
her character and her goals; 2 - how cind why the West lost,
or forfeited, a chance to be the dominant influence in
Nasser's Egypt; 3 - how the USSR came to fill the void
left by the West; 4 - how cind why the Soviet Union fell
short of its expectations of position and influence in
Egypt; 5 - how the Egyptians viewed the Soviet-Egyptian
relationship; 6 - the root causes of the Soviet failure
in Egypt; 7 - how the West (especially the United States)
can gain a position of influence in Egypt in the future;
8 - Egypt's possible prospects or courses of action if the
West does not maike an attempt to fill the vacuum left by
the Soviets.
Although this is only a brief analysis of such a criti-
cal event in international relations, this paper will allow
for a study of Egypt and her goals in the post World War
II era. Additionally, it will allow for cin examination of

one sector of Russian foreign policy and foreign policy
goals and perhaps give some insight into total Russian foreign
policy objectives. Finally, the paper will leave no doubt
in the reader's mind that the United States made some serious
judgmental errors in dealing with the Middle East and Egypt
after WW II aind the US can now take advantage of the break
between Egypt and Russia, an incident unique in international
relations, to gain a presence and influence she might have
had 25 years ago.

II. THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
It is impossible to delve into Egyptian-Russian rela-
tions without some historical perspective. The Middle East,
or Near East, has fascinated Russian rulers for centuries,
and, in fact, there is a history of Russian presence in the
Middle East that reaches back to the year 1000. This chapter
will set the stage for the Russian-Egyptian relationship of
the post World War II era by examining Russian interests
in the Middle East from the eleventh century until 1945.
Shortly after Russia became recognizable as a nation-
state, she expanded her trade routes to the north, west,
and south. The southern trade route brought Russia into
contact with the Byzantine Empire and Constantinople. This
was Russia's first contact with the Middle East. Russian
merchants traded not only with Constantinople, but also
with the rich areas around the Caspian Sea. With the expanded
trade cam territorial expansion; it was through these two
types of contact (economic and military) that Russia came
into contact with, and learned the ideas of, both Chris-
tieuiity and Islam. The lively trade with the Byzantine
Empire eventually led to Russia's desire for warm water ports
for her goods and for her fleets. It was through the southern
Walter Kirchner, History of Russia , (Barnes and Noble,
New York, 1963) p. 11.
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routes that Russian trade grew and prospered and this early
economic success led to Russia's increased fascination and
interest in the Middle East not only as an outlet for her
goods, but also as a source of knowledge and culture.
Russia's relations with the Near East continued to be
economic and cultural, and remained stable and prosperous
until late in the 17th century when Peter I (The Great)
became Tsar. The constant threat of the Crimean Tartars
forced Peter to declare war on Turkey (Turkey supported
the Tartars) aind Russia found herself in need of a navy,
specifically a fleet on the Black Sea. The fleet was built
and although the navy enjoyed some success, there was no
decisive outcome of the war and peace was concluded in 1700
with the Turks . The experience of the short was was signi-
ficant however, as it showed the Russians that they needed
a warm water port for the navy, and, additionally, needed
access to the Mediterranean if Russia was to be a strong
European power.
In the 1700 's Russia concluded several treaties with
2Turkey which gave Russia control of most of the Black Sea
coast, the Crimea and the territory up to and including the
foothills of the Caucasus, and the legal right to interfere
2
In the 1700 's Russia concluded three treaties with
Turkey: The Treaty of Belgrade in 1739; The Treaty of
Kuchuck Kainardji in 1774; and the Treaty of Jassey in 179 2
Walter Kirchner, The History of Russia , (Barnes &
Noble, New York, 1963) pps 121, 122.
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in internal Turkish affairs in certain specific instances.
These concessions did not satisfy Russia however, and the
dominant theme of Russian foreign policy, with regards to
the Middle East, was to gain control of a warm water port
and access to the open seas through the Mediterranean. The
vision to extend the Russian Empire southward into the
Middle East was the driving force during the reigns of
Peter the Great (1682-1725) and Catherine the Great (1762-
1796) , and continued through the reign of Nicholas II
(1894-1917)
.
The Russian gains of the 1700 's were nearly negated by
the outcome of the Crimean War which broke out in 1853. It
was in that year that the Tsar suggested — to England — the
deliberate proportioning of Turkey and the crumbling Ottoman
Empire. England categorically declined the "offer" as
she was interested in maintaining unchallenged routes through
the Mediterranean and unlimited economic privileges in
Turkey. The Turks were urged by the British to reject
Russian ultimatums — which they did — and Russian troops
invaded causing Sultan Abd al-Majid I to declare war. The
Ottoman Empire, backed by Britain and France, was victorious;
peace was concluded in Paris in 1856. The Treaty of Paris
cost Russia her previous gains in the Middle East; Russia
3Wynfred Joshua, Soviet Penetration into the Middle
East, (National Strategy Information Center, New York,
1970) p. 1.
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was forced to give up her territory in the Caucasus; she
was forced to renounce any protectorate in Turkey; she was
forced to dismantle her Black Sea fleet; and finally, she
was forced to abandon her shore fortifications on the Black
Sea.
Russian physical presence and influence remained at
this low — or even non-existent — level until the outbreak
of World War I. Events in Europe prior to WWI caused Russia
to ally with Britain and France against Germany and the
Ottoman Empire. With this alliance came British and French
recognition of Russian claims in the Black Sea and in the
Ottoman Empire. The success of the Allied powers in the
war would have guaranteed Russia not only her territorial
claims in Turkey, but also undisputed control of the Black
Sea, control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and heretofore
unprecedented influence in the Middle East were it not for
an ironic turn of events inside Russia.
When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917, they
renounced all previous Tsarist territorial claims and ambi-
4tions thereby nullifying any potential gains Russia might
have made in the Middle East as a result of WWI. Instead of
gaining influence and territory in the Middle East after
the war, Russia became the ideological ally of the colonized
4Wynfred Joshua, Soviet Penetration into the Middle
East
,
(National Strategy Information Center, New York,
1970) p. 1.
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people of the Arab states and renounced the colonialist,
imperialist, and territorial ambitions of the European
powers
.
After the revolution in 1917, domestic factors and
problems occupied most of the time of the new leaders;
foreign affairs was of little importance. In the first
few years following the revolution the Soviets considered
the rest of the world, especially the Middle East and similar
developing areas , as nothing more than a breeding ground
for the Communist revolution. Consideration of commerce
and geostrategy and foreign policy seemed to have no place
in the early policies of the new Bolshevik government.
When, in the early 19 20 's, the world-wide revolution failed
to materialize, the Soviets realized that they must — de
facto — exist in an international environment, and they
began to formulate a basic foreign policy.
The first Soviet policy makers did not view the Middle
East as a large area stretching from Northern Turkey to
Southern Egypt and from Iran to Morocco. Instead, they
seemed to divide the area into two regions; that is, the
region that bordered the Soviet Union and the "rest" of
the Middle East. Clearly Iran, and Turkey were much more
important as Russia's border nations to the South, than
were the other countries of the Middle East. Russia needed
their friendship and cooperation because of their value as
buffer zones, their primordial links with segments of the
14

5Russian population
, and because of the possibility of easily
obtained natural resources — namely oil. The remainder of
the Middle East was important only as a seedbed for the
revolution and as a chessboard on which to play the game of
one-upmanship with the colonial powers, primarily Great
Britain.
In 19 21 the Soviet Union began to court the new Turkish
regime of Kemal Ataturk . Even though Ataturk surpressed
the Communist Party in Turkey, the Russians realized the
need to cement relations between the two countries, and,
laying ideology aside, concluded a treaty of neutrality and
non-aggression with Turkey in 19 25. This treaty also allowed
Soviet ships to pass through Turkish straits. The Soviets
pursued the same course of action in Iran. As in Turkey the
revolutionary factions were surpressed and persecuted, but
the ideological hostility of the Soviets was attenuated by
the need to preserve the economic relations between the two
countries. In 1928 the Russians concluded a treaty with
Iran similar to that with Turkey.
When Egypt gained her independence from Britain in 19 22
Russia held high hopes for the revolution in this most impor-
tant region in the Middle East. Russia encouraged the for-
mation of an Egyptian Communist Party. When the revolution
5Robert E. Hunter, The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle
East
,
(The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969)
p. 3.
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did not occur, and it became clear that nationalism was
the driving force in Egypt, the Soviets lost interest.
Soviet interest and activity in the Middle East contin-
ued along these same patterns outlined above until after
World War II. The Soviets continued to support and encour-
age local communist parties, but the support was most ver-
bal. Communist parties were continually surpressed across
the Middle East because of either their attitude toward
religion (atheism and secularism are anathema to Islam)
,
or their revolutionary tendencies, or both.
Russia continued to trade with Turkey throughout the
19 20's and 19 30 's, but the relationship — already doomed by
the ideological split — took a turn for the worse just prior
to WWII when Russia began to press for concessions frnm
Turkey with regards to the Black Sea. Russia wanted entry
restricted in order to counter possible German maneuvers.
Turkey's concessions to Germany, her alliance with Britain
and France, and finally her determination to remain out of
the war all seemed to sound the deathknell for friendly
Turkish-USSR relations. (Economic and cultural relations
between the two countries have resumed and even expanded
in recent years, but the official attitudes of the Turks
and the Russians toward each other can only be described
as frigid.)
Throughout the post WWII period, the Russian troop
maneuvers on the Turkish border and the threatening propaganda
of Stalin was more than enough to cause the Turks to fear a
16

Russian invasion. With the enunciation of the Truman
Doctrine in March of 1947, Turkey's strategic position
underwent a basic change. Turkey was no longer an isolated
nation left to the whims of her stronger border neighbors;
she was now a very definite actor in the East-West confron-
tation arena. The Turks (at least the Turkish elites)
were quick to ally with the Western camp. This was the
blanket of security that Turkey needed, and, in fact, Soviet
interest in the Turkish straits and territory waned after
the Turkish alignment with the West. (The Soviets did not
want to push for a confrontation at that time.)
The Russians then centered their propaganda attack on
Turkey and its American connection, claiming that Turkey was
another United States pawn. The Soviet Union became in-
creasingly worried about Russian heartland security with
Turkey's new strategic-military position. Turkey's entrance
into NATO did not cause a change in the relationship between
Turkey and the USSR, but it did rule out any possibility of
a thaw in the icy relations.
There were at least seventy three instances of official,
"normal", diplomatic contacts between Turkey and Russia
between 1917 and 1953 in the form of official notes, formal
agreements, or treaties (including two as late as 1953).
With this piece of knowledge, or evidence, it becomes clear
Robert M. Slusser, Jan F. Triska, A Calendar of Soviet
Treaties, 1917-1957
,
(Stanford University Press, Stanford,
1959) pps. 523, 524.
17

that even though the Turkish-Soviet relationship had very
high peaks and very low valleys, and was under a great deal
of strain in the early 19 50 's, there were numerous contacts
between the two countries , and somewhat normal relations
with regards to trade, border rights, postal service, commun-
ications, and all those areas of involvement indigenous to
contiguous nations
.
The same pattern of relations that occurred between
Turkey and the Soviet Union was evident in Iranian-Soviet
affairs. Soviet-Iranian relations have always been under
a strain. Russia's Tsarist expansionist policy caused Iran
(Persia) to regard Russia with fear and distrust. During
the nineteenth century Iran lost territory to Russia on
7three separate occasions. Each of these losses followed
a period of military hostility. At the outset of World
War I the Russian army operated in northwestern Iran, dis-
regarding Iran's neutrality in the war; even after the
revolution in 1917, despite the denounciation of Tsarist
territorial ambitions, the Red Army invaded Iran's Caspian
region in 1920.
Shortly thereafter the Soviet government reassessed its
policies toward Iran, and in February 1921 concluded a
treaty of friendship and non-aggression with the Iranian
7George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East ,
(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington, 1972) p. 23.
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government, just as it had done with its other southern border
nations of Turkey and Afghanistan. The treaty endured for
the next twenty years, but the era could best be described
as armed truce rather than friendship. Throughout this
period Marxists-Leninists described the Iranian government
as revolutionary, moving in the proper direction — away from
British imperialism; yet Soviet agents were active in the
country attempting to split up the government. The "armed
truce" came to an end in 19 41 when Soviet troops moved into
northern Iran in order to secure safe- passage of war supplies
from the West to the Soviet Union.
The end of the war failed to bring a lessening of tension
between Iran and Russia. Iran again felt endangered by the
Soviet Union late in 194 5 when the Kurds in northern Iran
proclaimed a separate Kurdish Repxiblic with the help and
support of the Russians. Almost simultaneously the Azerbaijan
Democrats, who were local Communist insurgents supported by
Soviet agents, seized power in Azerbaijan and declared the
province a separate regime. These two actions clearly
presented a danger to the integrity of Iran. With the
announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the encouragement
of the United States, Iran was able to forestall Soviet
expansion into her territory and restore Iranian rule over
the two provinces. This turn of events worsened Soviet-
Iranian relations.
gSlusserand Triska, op. cit . , pp. 18, 489
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When British imperialism raised its head again in Iran
over oil concession rights (a concession that the Soviets
had coveted for years)
, the Soviet press began to support
Iran in its economic and ideological battle with Britain.
The issue of oil rights, or oil concessions, split Iran into
several political factions, each with its own plan of action;
one of these factions was the Tudeh party, the local Communist
party in Iran. The Tudeh had the support of Moscow and
continued to be a source of dissention and irritation within
the Iranian government. The United States finally "stepped
into" the Iranian crisis on the side of the Shah and offered
not only moral support but economic aid as well. Thus the
United States became the principle outside actor in Iran,
and this new Iranian-U.S. relationship led to the acceptance
9
of the Baghdad Pact by Iran in 19 55. Once again Soviet
policy and ambition in the Middle East had been thwarted,
and Soviet-Iranian relations were at their lowest point in
history.
Amidst all of the diplomatic and ideological hostility,
Iran continued to have official, if not normal, contacts
with the Soviet Union. As in the case of Turkey, the Iranian
government concluded more than seventy agreements and treaties
with the Soviet Union from 1920 to 1957, including several
g
Ivo T. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich, eds . , The Soviet
Union and the Middle East , (Hoover Institute Press, Stanford,
1974.) pp. 70,71.
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agreements concerning trade and port facilities in 19 54 and
1955. Even though official Soviet policy towards Iran was
a failure, there was obviously some normalcy of relations
between the two governments owing, once again, to the
contiguous nature of the two nations.
As far as the rest of the Middle East is concerned,
there was very little Soviet presence or influence from
1917 to 1954. The Middle East was a source of great intel-
lectual curiosity for Soviet scholars from a cultural,
historic, and religious point of view. However, the Soviets
did not attribute any strategic importance to the area until
the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the advent of
the Cold War and the ensuing East-West military-politico
confrontation. As a result of this assessment by Moscow,
the Middle East (excluding Turkey and Iran) had no impact
on Soviet foreign policy other than to furnish propaganda to
the Marxist-Leninists for their ideological battle with
imperialism, colonialism, and the West.
Much of the Middle East was colonial or under a protec-
torate system until the outbreak of World War II. As a
result, there was virtually no contact between the Soviet
Union and Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Egypt
(although officially independent) until the early 1940 's.
Previously the Russians had established diplomatic relations
with Saudi Arabia (then called the Hijaz) in 1924, but this
Slusser and Triska, op. cit
. , pp. 317-329, 489-491.
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relationship never grew or matured due largely to the
difference of opinion over religion and Islam. As early
as 1928 the Soviet Union established relations, both diplo-
matic and economic, with Yemen, but again the relationship
never grew. By 195 7 the Soviet Union and Yemen had concluded
only seven agreements or treaties in contrast with more than
seventy with Turkey and Iran where relations were hostile.
The Soviets established diplomatic relations with Egypt
in 194 3; with Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon in 1944; and with
Israel in 1948. Prior to establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with these countries, any contact was either through
trade missions or through local Communist parties. Through-
out the period 1920-1945 the nations of the Middle East were
struggling to become independent; Arab nationalism was on
the rise. There was no hurry on the part of any Arab nation
to court the Soviet Union as a sponsor or benefactor. There
was considerable dislike and distrust of the Soviet Union
as a result of the Soviet's aggressive policies toward Turkey
and Iran, and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on religion. The
people and governments of the Arab nations were not inclined
to rid themselves of one colonial power in favor of another.
With this historical perspective it becomes clear that
the stage is set for the Soviet move, indeed an all out
effort, for presence and influence in the Middle East. In
contrast to the popular conclusion that the Soviet advance
into the Middle East was a radical new adventure in foreign
policy requiring a modification of Marxism-Leninism, we can
22

now see that the move was a strategic necessity brought about
by a rapidly changing international environment tipping the
balance in favor of the West, and a failing Soviet foreign
policy on her southern border. The West, led by the United
States, was successful in encircling the USSR with NATO and
the Baghdad Pact countries, cind the West was waging a success-
ful propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union and the
"evils" of Communism. The Soviet Union had to expand its
foreign policy horizons if it was to mount a counter offensive
to Western propaganda attacks, increase its sphere of influence,
and expcmd the buffer zone around Russia. The early Bolshevik
regime had already dealt with, and concluded trade agreements
and treaties with, nations in the Middle East — nations other
than Communist states; therefore, no change in ideology or
Marxism-Leninism was required. All that was required was a
reassessment of current foreign policy and national goals.
The Soviets anxiously awaited an opportunity to enlist client
states that would allow Russia to make inroads in the Western
sphere of influence or break the chain of containment, or
both. Egypt provided just such an opportunity in 1955.
23

III. THE GENESIS OF THE EGYPTIAL-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP:
1945-1954
Although there were few contacts between the Soviet Union
and Egypt between 1945 and 1954, there were a number of
significant events that, in jretrospect, served to lay the
foundation for the genesis of the Soviet-Egyptian relation-
ship that was to come. As there was no real relationship
between the two countries during this period — other than the
formal, diplomatic relationship — this chapter will serve to
highlight the events which would eventually bring Egypt and
the Soviet Union together in 1955.
The Soviet attitude toward Egypt in the post war era can
be summarized quickly. The Soviets considered Egypt only
formally independent. As far as Moscow was concerned, Egypt
was still an English colony, and all of Egypt's interests
were parallel with Britain's. Russian writers concluded that
the possibility of a workers revolt in Egypt was practically
nil. They wrote of a "national bourgeoisie" in Egypt which
cut across all social and economic strata; a bourgeoisis
whose interests were thought to be identical with Britain's.
Soviet hopes for a Communist takeover in Egypt rested
squarely with the local Egyptian Communist party. Local
Communist factions were quite active in 1946 but faced
A.R.C. Bolton, Soviet Middle East Studies; An Analysis
and Bibliography , Part IV: Egypt; (Chatham House Memoranda,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1959) pps 1, 7, 10.
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insurmountable opposition; the Ismail Sidqi government was
determined to suppress the Communists and the Soviets were
too preoccupied with domestic and border problems to consider
aiding the Egyptian Communist party.
As part of the wartime effort to solidify alliances
against the Axis powers, Russia established diplomatic
relations — on the legation level — with Egypt in July of
1943. (The legation was upgraded to Embassy status in
March, 19 54.) Even though Egypt did not figure prominently
in Russian foreign policy plans, there were several important
trade and commercial agreements concluded between the two
2
countries m the years 1948 - 1954.
The Egyptian revolution in July 19 52 did little to change
the Soviet attitude toward Egypt and the potential there for
Communism. The initial Soviet reaction to the coup and the
new leaders was a mixture of caution and even hostility. The
coup in Egypt was seen in Moscow as Anglo-American rivalry
3for predominance in Egypt. The An Nahar research staff wrote
that "... the overwhelming impression during this period is
that the Soviet Union considered the 1952 revolution to be of
little significance either for its own policies toward the
4
country or for the Egyptian people themselves".
2Slusser and Triska, op. cit
.
,
pps 474-475.
3Aryeh Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror , (Israel
University Press, Jerusalem, 1973) pps 34-35.
4 Riad N. Rayyes , Dunia Nahas , eds
.
, The Dragon and the
Bear, (An Nahar Press Service, Beirut, 1973) p. 9.
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Asi late as July, 1954 (the date of the Anglo-Egyptian
agreement providing for British withdrawal from the Suez
Canal) the Soviets were convinced that Egypt was an American
client. Pravda (August 8, 1954) renounced the agreement as
a "dangerous step towards supporting American plans for a
Middle East Command, which is a direct threat to the cause
of peace in the Middle East"
.
During the months that followed, the Soviets became
acutely aware that Egypt was not in the American camp, nor
even in the Western camp. Moscow analysts also concluded
that the new government in Egypt was strong and stable — and
in need of aid. This reassessment of Egyptian-Western rela-
tions came at a time when Moscow was beginning to feel the
effects of the United States containment and encirclement
policies; Soviet leaders had begun to look around the world
for areas where Russia could contest the West. When Egypt
appeared as a possible chink in the US ' s armour, the Soviets
decided to re-evaluate Egypt's potential as a client and
ally and did not hesitate to step into Egypt when the
opportunity arose.
In order to understand the Soviet-Egyptian alliance that
began in 1955, we must look at the events which led to the
July 19 5 2 revolution, without which there could never have
been any close tie between Egypt and the USSR.
There were, obviously, many factors which led to the 19 52
Egyptian revolution; among them were: the inability of the
Egyptian government to deal with the British (that is, remove
26

the British from Egypt and effectively manage internal
affairs); the faltering economy, which was supported by
Britain; the totally unequal distribution of land and wealth
in Egypt; and the inability of the government to raise,
train, and maintain an armed force capable of providing both
internal and external security.
One of the contributing factors occurred; ten years before
the revolution. In 1942 the Egyptian military, indeed the
government itself, suffered a humiliating experience at the
hands of the British. Although seemingly insignificant at
the time, the "Abdin Palace Coup" would leave a lasting
impression on the Egyptian military, particularly the leaders
of the 1952 revolt.
It was in February, 19 42 that the Abdin Palace Coup took
place. King Farouk had become displeased with his Foreign
Minister and asked for his resignation. The result was that
the entire government under Hussein Sirry resigned and a
political crisis developed. The British feared that the
King would replace the Sirry government with a government
headed by Aly Maher, a man the British believed to be
sympathetic to the Axis powers. The British therefore,
through Ambassador Lampson, tried to persuade King Farouk
to name Nahas Pasha, a neutralist, as Prime Minister. Farouk
refused. The following day the British literally stormed the
palace with armoured cars and armed troops and threatened the
King with forced abdication unless he appointed Nahas Pasha.
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The King relented. This humiliation, witnessed by many
Egyptiam military elite, would serve to help lay the founda-
tion for the 19 52 revolt. Additionally, the Abdin Palace
Coup sowed the seeds for the future Egyptian obsession for
a strong military and a government completely free of all
foreign domination.
The most direct cause of the revolution was the defeat
of the Egyptian army by Israel in 1948. Egypt (the King)
decided to move openly against the Israelis in support of
the Palestinians despite the insistence by General Naguib
and other military leaders that Egypt act covertly and
continue to equip and train the army before moving openly.
The military advice was ignored. As a result, the Egyptian
army was ill-trained, poorly supplied, and uncoordinated.
The war ended in February, 1949; Egypt and the Arabs had been
badly defeated. If we add to these factors the perception by
the military leaders that throughout the war the political
string pulling behind the scenes was more imprtant than the
battlefield operations, then we have a very disillusioned
military, ripe for revolt agains — in their eyes — an
ineffective government.
Riad el-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas , of the An Nahar research
staff, summed up the effect of the 1949 v/ar thusly:
5 Robert Stephens, Nasser; A Political Biography
,
(Simon
& Schuster, New York, 1971) pps 54-56.
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Although the defeat was basically a military
one, the Egyptian officers felt that the ultimate
blame lay with the corrupt monarchy cind the
decadent social structure upon which it rested.
These defeated soldiers returned home from
the front regarding themselves as victims of the
ills of Egyptian society. Nasser, who took part
in the 194 8 war, summed up the situation with the
remark, 'The biggest battlefield is in Egypt.
'
Thus the younger and more politically minded
officers became convinced that the most effective
weapon in the struggle against Israel and Zionism
would be a strong, regular army, and the^ realized
that monarchist Egypt would never produce such a
military.
^
While the events cited above are surely not all of the
causes of the July 1952 revolution, they are listed here
because they were not only contributing factors of the
revolution, but also factors in the making of the Soviet-
Egyptian alliance that was to come.
There are a few other noteworth events that occurred
between 194 5 and 1952 that bear mentioning here as they too
helped shape the forthcoming Soviet-Egyptian relationship.
A sccinning of the New York Times for the period in question
reveals that a recurring theme in the Soviet press from 19 46
to 19 50 was the denouncing of the United States cind British
presence in Egypt. Most authorities on the Soviet Union,
and indeed the beginning of this chapter, lead the reader to
believe that the Soviets virtually ignored the Middle East
and Egypt until the 1950 's. Yet in perusing the periodicals
of that time we see that as early as 19 4 6 the Soviet Union
g
Riad N. el-Rayyes, Dunia Nahas , eds
.
; Politics in Uniform
,
(An Nahar Press Service, Beirut, 1972) p. 17.
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used the Middle East and Egypt as a propaganda springboard
to initiate attacks on the West.
At the same time that the USSR was denouncing US and
British presence auid influence in Egypt (1946 - 1950) , the
Egyptian government was attempting to negotiate arms deals
and foreign aid with both the United States and Great
7Britain. As we shall see later, Egypt, for all practical
purposes, was unsuccessful in her attempt to secure aid of
any kind from the West.
It is interesting to note that even before the revolution
there were suggestions in Egypt of an Egyptian-Soviet rela-
tionship. During 1951 there were a number of contradictory
positions taken by the Egyptian government and press concerning
the possibility of expanded Soviet-Egyptian relations. In
April of 19 51 the Egyptian government seized 26 Communists
and began another purge of Communists and Communist related
activities. On June 7, 1951, the New York Times carried an
article which stated that the Egyptian press had accused
Nahas Pasha (the Prime Minister) and some of his closest
associates of having contacted the USSR. Despite this anti-
Soviet feeling in Egypt, on September 4, 1951, Foreign
Minister Fahmi proposed buying arms from Russia as Egypt
was unable to obtain weapons from the West. On October 27,
7There are numerous references to this theme; a few are
cited here: The New York Times , Feb 25, 1946, 3:5; Mar 14,
1946, 2:2; May 8, 194 6, 3:4; Oct 10, 1946, 6:7; May 10, 1947,
5:3; Apr 16, 1948, 11:5; Sept 29, 1948, 6:5; May 28, 1949,
2:4; July 4, 1949, 4:2; Aug 2, 1949, 3:4.
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1951, both the New York Times and the London Times carried
articles based on sources in Egypt that declared that rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and Egypt were quite friendly
and that the groundwork, was being laid for future trade and
cultural exhanges between the two nations
.
In retrospect, it is possible to deduce that as early as
1951 the Soviet Union began to think in terms of Egypt as a
potential Middle Eastern ally and was willing to overlook .
not only Egypt's non-Communist orientation, but also her
continuous persecution of Communists and the Communist Party.
Given the nature of Joseph Stalin and Communist Party doctrine
at the time, this dediction, or analysis, is on shaky ground
at best. It is possible though, that the Soviet foreign
policy reorientation to a global scale that was evident in
1955-1956 had its beginning in 1951. In any event, whatever
potential there might have been for an expanded Egyptian-
Soviet relationship in 1951, ended with the Egyptian "Free
Officer's" revolution in July 19 52.
The details of the Egyptian Revolution are not important
to this paper. The factors concerning the revolt that bear
on this paper are: 1) on July 23, 19 52 the Egyptian "Free
Officer's Association" forced King Farouk into exile and
took control of the government; (2) the "Free Officer's
Association" had elected Gamal Abdul Nasser as their
president in 1950 cind it was he who planned most aspects of
the coup; 3) the group of officers who revolted included
Nasser, Naguib, Sadat, and Sabry — the men who would shape
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Egypt's future after 19 52; (4) immediately after the coup
the President of the newly declared Republic of Egypt was
General Mohammed Naguib who also headed the RCC (Revolutionary
Command Council) ; after the revolution both Nasser and Sadat
preferred to remain out of government and attend to the
affairs of the army.
In the months that followed the revolution. General
Naguib and his cabinet were primarily concerned with domestic
affairs. Naguib did, however, press his country's requests
for aid and military hardware with both the United States and
Britain (as Egypt could not ignore the necessity of both
internal and external security) declaring that the West
should honor the conditions of the 19 50 Tripartite
gDeclaration. Naguib and his advisors, for reasons stated
above, realized that one of their first tasks was to stabilize
and revitalize the army. At the same time they knew that they
must defend themselves against the Israelis who continued to
receive large shipments of arms from the West.
One of the first official actions taken by Naguib was to
send a detailed list of urgently needed defensive weapons to
Washington. The request was for modern, defensive weapons
in hopes of modernizing the Egyptian army. Through bureau-
cratic red tape and administrative mix-ups the list that the
o
The demand for arms by both the Israelis and the Arabs
prompted the American initiative which resulted in the Tri-
partite Declaration of 1950. The declaration stated that the
US, Britain, and France would maintain a balance in the
supply of arms to the Middle East, and further stated that
the three would guarantee the territorial status quo.
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newly elected President Eisenhower received was an old list,
prepared by Faroiik and his cabinet and was totally different
from the Naguib list in that it (the Farouk list) specified
weapons designed for internal security and riot control. On
the basis of the items on the list that he saw, President
Eisenhower, with the urging of Prime Minister Churchill,
9denied the request. (Churchill feared that any weapons
received by the Egyptians — especially modern weapons — would
be used against the British to oust them from Egypt and the
Suez Canal.) This denial of military aid by the United
States was the first of several denials, and coupled with
the arms embargos levied by the British and French against
the Egyptians, left Egypt with a poorly equipped army and
without an arms supplier.
There was virtually no contact between the USSR and Egypt
during the last half of 1952, and the contacts during 1953
concerned cultural exchanges and trade agreements on future
wheat cuid cotton crops. From the Egyptian point of view,
this first year and a half of power was a dismal eighteen
months for the Revolutionary Command Council; yet the RCC
obviously had not considered the Soviet Union as a potential
source of aid. During the same period of time, from the
Soviet point of view, the prospect of Egypt's becoming a
client state and recipient of Soviet aid was quite real.
9Mohammed H. Heikal, The Cairo Docuir.ents , (Doubleday &
Co., Garden City, N.J., 1973) pps 39,40.
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By 1953 Russia was feeling the effects of successful United
States foreign policy around the world. Russia was encircled
by NATO; she was unable to complete her buffer zone of
defense because of a failing foreign policy in Turkey and
Iran; and, the USSR was losing ground to the Americans on
the ideological battlefield. Clearly the Soviets had to
re-evaluate their foreign policy and their foreign policy
strategy and tactics if they were to compete effectively
with the West in the international arena. Clearly the
Soviets saw the possibility of a Soviet-Egyptian relation-
ship before the Egyptians as indicated by the constant press
coverage that Pravda afforded the Egyptian-United States
dialogue. While condemning the new Egyptian regime as
militaristic and a pawn of the West, the Soviet press reacted
even more harshly to the continuous denials of aid by the
United States and Great Britain, stating that this kind of
policy (arming Israel and denying aid to Egypt) could only
lead to increased tension in the Middle East and therefore
was detrimental to the cause of world peace. Obviously the
Soviets felt that Egypt should be armed, and if the USSR
could win Egypt as an ally or client, she would win a great
victory in the ideological arena, as well as garner a method
for stepping over "containment" and NATO.
In Egypt the domestic ills of the country had brought
the government to a political crisis. Three Naguib cabinets
had resigned within eighteen months; the economy of the
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country was no better than it was at the time of the revolt;
Egypt was unable to secure any guarantees of aid — military
or economic — during the months that followed the revolution;
and Egypt was unable to defend itself from continuing Israeli
attacks. Nasser could remain silent no longer. In April
1953, Nasser began to meike himself more and more of a public
figure. He overtly influenced domestic politics and his
name was constantly in the press. Finally, in early 19 54,
Nasser realized that he must take over from Naguib and accept
the mandate of the RCC that he — Nasser — save the revolution.
On April 17, 19 5 4 Nasser became Prime Minister (and actual
head of government) of the Republic of Egypt.
Although unpredictable at the time, the decision by the
Soviet Union to expand its foreign policy horizons and the
Egyptian determination to obtain foreign aid — both military
and economic — was to bring the two countries together in
1955. The foundation for the Soviet-Egyptian alliance had
been laid.
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IV. EGYPTIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS 1954-1970;
THE NASSER ERA
Although Nasser was a prime mover in the revolution and
had a strong following of military elite, he was never an
official member of the government until June 19 5 3 when he
entered the cabinet as a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of the Interior. After that time a split developed in the
inner circles of government between Naguib and Nasser and
their supporters. (For Nasser that included the Council of
the Revolution, or the RCC.) The rift was over domestic
policy and methodology. Naguib wanted to end the "revolu--
tionary period" and return control of the government to a
parliament and the people, while Nasser and the RCC felt that
power and control must remain closely guarded and centralized,
Naguib challenged Nasser by resigning in February, 1954,
thereby hoping to muster popular support and a mcindate from
the people to return to office. Naguib wanted to force the
hand of the RCC and expose what he considered a potential
This is not intended to imply that Nasser had no
authority or power until June 19 53. Analysts and observers
agree that the real power in Egypt from the revolution onward
was Nasser. In The Cairo Documents Heikal tells us, "On the
Egyptian side General Naguib was still titular head of the
revolution, but by now, ten months after King Farouk had been
deposed, it had become obvious that Nasser was the man who
held the power." Biographer Robert Stephens states in,
Nasser, A Political Biography , "The true power structure of
the regime was beginning to emerge. At its core was the
Council of the Revolution. . .but to those who had serious
business to transact with the Egyptian government it was
becoming increasingly clear that the man who counted was
Nasser.
"
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coup. Following several rounds of political maneuvering,
Naguib was persuaded to return as President and Lt/Col
Khaled Mohieddin was installed as Prime Minister. (Mohieddin
was a close associate and staunch backer of Nasser.) These
political compromises were simply delaying tactics by Nasser
who still felt that Naguib must resign if the goals of the
revolution were to be realized.
Beginning in March, 1954 Nasser engineered a subtle in
house coup. With Naguib out of the country (in the Sudan)
Nasser had several hundred of Naguib ' s supporters arrested.
The, using reverse psychology, the RCC issued a communique
announcing that on July 24, 19 54, the Council would proclaim
the end of the Egyptian Revolution and surrender power to
an assembly. The announcement had the desired effect; the
Army, the trade unions, and most other organized groups in
Egypt did not want to return to the ways and means of the
old regime. Nasser was able to channelize this swelling
sentiment in popular demonstrations which called for a
continuation of the revolution with Nasser as the leader.
The Free Officers and the RCC "called on Nasser" to settle
the crisis. On April 17, 1954 Naguib, suffering from
exhaustion and strain, resigned once again. Nasser became
Premier and Naguib (because of his popularity) was kept
2President in name only; Nasser held the real power.
2For a complete account of Nasser's "Path to Power", see
Stephens , op. cit.
,
Chapter 5
.
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when Nasser took control of the government he inherited
all of the problems that Naguib had faced, but now at near
crisis proportions. Nasser had several immediate, short
range objectives that he pursued from the outset. He knew
he must first centralize and strengthen the government; he
had to strengthen the economy and continue land reform;
finally, he had to strengthen, train, and equip the armed
forces as he had to be able to defend Egypt from both
internal and foreign aggressors. Without question, Nasser's
success in realizing his goals for Egypt were dependent on
foreign support; he needed moral support from his Arab
neighbors and financial and military support from the great
powers
.
By mid 1954 Egypt was at the crossroads, not only caught
up in the East-West struggle, but also embroiled in a British-
Egyptian battle over colonialism, independence, and the Suez
Cauial, and further, squarely in the center of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Nasser wasted no time in attacking these problems. The
very fact that he took control of the government seemed to
strengthen and centralize the regime. A month after taking
office Nasser reorganized the cabinet. He appointed Gamal
Salem as Deputy Prime Minister, Major General Abdel Hakim
Amir as Minister of War, and Lt/Col Anwar el Sadat as
Minister of State. Nasser now had his closest associates
in the cabinet and the full support of the RCC. Additionally,
Nasser and the Council had the mandate of the people to
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continue the provisional government and the spirit of the
revolution. The Egyptian motto of, "Unity, Discipline,
Work", born during this era, reflected the spirit of the
revolution. Nasser felt that his first problem was solved,
or at least under control ; he had Egypt and the government
on the proper path and now he and the Council could work on
the more difficult problems of national security and foreign
aid. Of these two dilemmas, the problem of national security
was the foremost and most critical. The growing arsenal in
Israel, the increased number of incidents in the Gaza and
along the Suez Canal, and the deadlocked negotiations over
British withdrawal from the Canal, and the arms embargos
imposed on Egypt by both Britain and France, all indicated
that security — both internal and external — was Egypt's most
serious problem.
The problem of recognition (de jure) by foreign govern-
ments and securing foreign aid did not seem to Nasser to be
a difficult hurdle at the outset. Initially most foreign
governments watched the new Egyptian regime with skepticism;
the world did not know what to expect of the military take-
over in Egypt. By the time Nasser became Prime Minister,
most governments had accepted the fact that the new Egyptian
government was a reality, and stable enough to endure. Even
the Soviet skepticism that the Egyptian coup was sponsored
by the United States in an attempt to replace the British
was waning.
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Nasser and the Council were extremely concerned over
the lack of an aid and arms supplier to Egypt, but continued
to believe that aid would materialize at any moment — from
the West. Nasser knew full well that he and Egypt were
important factors in the East-West confrontation contest.
Even before 1954 Nasser — and Egypt — had become involved
in the international politics of the period. As pointed out
in the previous chapter, Egypt was regarded as a potentially
valuable ally to the USSR even before the revolution in 1952.
The perception was no different in the West, The United
States, specifically John Foster Dulles, wanted Egypt in the
Western camp.
We must remember that John Foster Dulles (Secretary of'
State under Eisenhower) was virtually obsessed with containing
Communism and nullifying its effect on nations and peoples of
the world. Dulles saw his — and the United States' — role
as negator, or even eradicator of Communism in as short a
time as possible. To this end it seemed that Dulles would
stop at nothing. It was this quest that brought Dulles to
Cairo in May of 1953 for a meeting with Nasser — the only
meeting these two men would ever have. There were two
objectives of this visit. The first was to try to arrange
a peace between the Arabs and the Israelis, and the second
was to convince Nasser that Egypt should be part of MEDO
(Middle East Defense Organization which never came about)
or at least part of NATO. The latter objective would help
Dulles shore up the chain of nations encircling Communism
and the USSR.
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Dulles appeared to Nasser to be diplomatic, dogmatic,
and yet receptive. At the meeting between the two men Dulles
laid out the American concerns over Soviet aggression, Middle
East oil, the vacuum created by the departure of both Britain
and Frcince from the Middle East, and the growing tension
caused by the Arab-Israeli crisis. It seemed to Nasser that
Dulles was sincere and would go to any length to secure the
"help" and allegiamce of Egypt. Nasser continued, however,
to assert his and Egypt's determination to remain independent
of outside influence and apart from the East-West confronta-
tion. Nasser did not wish to be a part of either camp. He
thought that his determination to individually resist Soviet
influence would be sufficient for Dulles and the United
States. As we shall see shortly, it was not.
The dinner meeting that evening made a profound impression
on Dulles. He was frsuikly impressed with Nasser. As a result
of the meeting Dulles softened somewhat on his approach to the
Middle East. He was no longer convinced of the necessity of
MEDO; he gained a different perspective on Egypt's plight
with Britain and became convinced of the need to ease Britain
out of the Suez; lastly, Dulles became even more determined
to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem.
The immediate result desired by Nasser did not come
about. Nasser v/anted arms, and nothing that was said at that
meeting produced any optimism in the Egyptian leader. In
3Heikal, op. cit
.
,
pps 31-33.
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fact, all Nasser heard concerning arms was that his original
shopping list had been turned down in large part due to the
pressure of the British and Winston Churchill. British
pressure on Washington and Eisenhower was relentless on the
issue of arms to Egypt and therefore the possibility of
military aid for Egypt from the West was very slight. Dulles
seems as though he wants ot help. Egypt but can not,
A year after the meeting between Dulles and Nasser,
Dulles' true feelings about the Middle East and the United
States' policy toward that region came to light. On the
eve of Churchill's visit to Washington and Eisenhower
(June 18, 1954) Dulles "confessed" that the United States
policy in the Middle East was being hampered by the ties
between the United States, Britain, and France. (West
Europe) . The United States traditionally supported British
and French policy and by so doing was unable to act freely
and in the best interest of the United States and Egypt in
the Middle East. Dulles admitted that the United States
must continue to follow this policy (support of Britain and
Frcince) "even reluctantly" in order to keep the US and
4Western Europe united in the effort to thwart Communism.
This "admission" by Dulles bore out what the developing
nations of the world, especially those in the Middle East,
had come to believe.
4 The Egyptian Mail , Cairo, June 18, 1954, p. 1.
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In contrast to this perception, immediately after WWII
the emerging nations of the world looked to the United States
for leadership with awe and envy. The United States was the
champion of freedom; the US had the resources and production
capability that inspired imitation; the American ideal or
ideology was attractive to developing, newly independent,
nations; and the United States had material luxuries that
were the result of ambition, invention, and hard work. The
United States wore an aura of both success and glamour,
shining out above the failures of the old world imperialists.
For nearly a decade after WWII the peoples of the emerging
nations were receptive to the idea that America should play
a major role in their respective parts of the world; the
Middle East was no exception. But, by 19 55 it was clear
that United States and European interests were irrevocably
linked, and the United States came to be identified with
European interests; further, Americans began to be regarded
as colonialists and imperialists through their association
with West Europe.
Nasser was well aware of this transition of attitudes
toward the United States; he himself harbored the same
feelings. Yet, amidst this growing tide of anti-Americanism
and continuing wave of anti-Europeanism, Nasser reaffirmed
Egypt's close ties with the West. At the same time that
Nasser reorganized the cabinet (September 1, 1954) he issued
a statement that, in retrospect, must have been a plea for
Western aid and sympathy for the Republic of Egypt. Nasser
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reiterated Egypt's determination not to join any mutual
defense pacts. Yet he conceded that Egypt needed to defend
herself from local attack by the Israelis and that if there
were a global threat to Egypt it was the Soviet Union. He
further asserted that Egypt was traditionally, historically,
5
and economically linked with the West.
Nasser continued this approach of verbally linking Egypt
with the West and the results were favorable, but short
lived. In August Britain had agreed to lift the ban on
export of war materials to Egypt and declared her intention
to uphold the Tripartite Declaration. In November the
United States signed an agreement in Cairo committing
$40 million to Egypt for agriculture and irrigation. But
still there were no arms. Britain's pronouncements of
August were just diplomatic rhetoric; Britain never sent any
war materials to Egypt. Additionally the other signatories
of the Tripartite Declaration failed to ship any war supplies
to Egypt causing Nasser to feel — at the close of 1954 — that
the Republic of Egypt was on the brink of disaster and
possible collapse. Nasser's two most pressing problems
5The London Times , September 2, 1954.
g
It is important at this point to outline Egyptian military
strength. A review of the Military Balance , the SIPRI Arms
Trade Register , and Brassey's Annual shows the following
Egyptian armed strength: (1955 figures) Army = 85,000; Navy -
5,000; Air Force - 10,000; National Guard - 50,000; Ground
Force Weapons - UK Centurions (tanks) 32, US Shermans 150,
French AMX 13 's 20; Aircraft - 40 UK Spitfire, 45 UK Vampires,
10 UK Avro Anson Trainers, 6 US Transports, 2 US and 3 UK
Helicopters; Ships - 3 UK Frigates, 2 UK Destroyers.
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those of national security and foreign assistance, were
now one and the same.
The next turning point in Egyptian affairs came in
February of 19 55 when the Israelis raided cin Egyptian camp
at Gaza amd reportedly killed thirty seven soldiers. The
attack was presumably ordered by Ben Gurion (the Israeli
Prime Minister) and set the pattern for Israeli retaliation
7
or punitive raids. The raid came at a critical time in
Nasser's political career. There was great dissension in
the Arab world, Nasser was opposed to the Baghdad Pact
believing that it was an attempt by Britain to unite other
Arab states against Egypt; further, there was a meeting of
Arab Prime Ministers in January in Cairo that collapsed in
disarray. Nasser had no local Arab support and was losing
the support of the Egyptian people. In short, Nasser was
under great pressure. He had to get arms from somewhere.
He had to equip his army in order to face the threats in the
Middle East. Nasser faced the possibility that his vision
of a strong, independent Egypt might never materialize.
Egypt attempted to buy World War II weapons from the
nations in Europe. Nasser got a few pieces of equipment from
Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, but most of these were
obsolete. At the same time that Nasser was buying arms in
Europe, Israel was receiving large shipments of arms from
France. For Nasser this was intolerable and served to
7Stephens, op. cit.
,
pps 154-155
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heighten the tension in the Arab world and increased the
need for Egypt to obtain arms . When the new American
Ambassador, Henry Byroade , arrived in Cairo (February, 1955)
Nasser met with him immediately to press his request for
arms; Byroade said that he would send an urgent message to
Dulles
.
Dulles was not able to help Nasser even if he wanted to.
As pointed out above, the US relationship with Western
Europe prevented an independent US foreign policy toward
Egypt. At that particular moment in history however, Dulles
was not disposed to helping Egypt; he was very displeased
with Nasser. Besides his rejection of the Baghdad Pact and
other "entangling alliances", Nasser had decided to attend
a conference of non-aligned nations in Bandung, Indonesia.
To Dulles there was no such entity as a non-aligned nation;
every nation had to be on one side or the other. Dulles
tried to persuade Nasser to boycott the conference. Dulles
was unsuccessful and saw Nasser's decision as a betrayal of
his (Dulles') anti-Communist crusade. No arms were forth-
coming from the United States.
The Bandung Conference was attended by Nasser, U Nu of
Burma, Nehru of India, and Chou En-lai of China. The
relationship that was to develop between Nasser and Chou
was to prove historic. Nasser and Chou talked of exchanging
goods and crops ; they talked of cultural exchange and of the
conference. Gradually Nasser switched the topic to arms.
Nasser confided that what he really needed was cooperation
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in obtaining arms. He asked Chou if the Russians would sell
arms to Egypt, Chou assured Nasser that he would ask the
Soviets, and added that he (Chou) believed that the Russians
now thought very highly of Egypt and of Nasser. This was
the first real overture of an arms deal with the Soviet
gUnion. As far as Nasser was concerned, this was the only
option left open to him,
Chou En-lai did query the Soviets and they indicated that
if Nasser himself approached them, they were ready to deal.
On May 18, 1955 Nasser attended a party at the Sudanese
Mission in Cairo, The Soviet Ambassador was also in
attendance. As Nasser greeted Ambassador Solod he said,
"I wanted to see you." Solod replied, "I have been instructed
to ask for an audience with you." Nasser continued, "And you,
wouldn't you give us arms?". The Soviet Ambassador immediately
replied, "I'll give you the answer the day after tomorrow.".
When Solod appeared in Nasser's office two days later he
brought a complete folder: a list of available arms;
9delivery dates; payment methods; and means of transfer.
The discussions continued through May, June, and July. The
Soviets sent Colonel Nimoshenko to survey Egypt s ' require-
ments. Both parties were ready to sign the agreement in
September 1955, but the Soviets were not ready to be
Q
Heikal, op. cit
.
,
pps 47,48.
9George Naccache, "Conversation With Nasser", Arab
World, Beirut, April 16, 1956, p. 6.
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identified as a party to the deal. They used Czechoslovakia
as a go-between to try to mask the fact that the arms were
actually Russian weapons shipped from the Soviet Union.
Even before all of this transpired Nasser gave the United
States smother opportunity to supply weapons. After Nasser
met with Solod he met with US Ambassador Byroade and informed
him that he (Nasser) had a firm committment from the Soviet
Union to supply arms to Egypt. Nasser again reiterated his
need for arms and advised Byroade that Egypt would rather
have Western weapons. Russian weapons would be unfamiliar
to the Egyptian forces; there would be a language barrier;
there would certainly be world-wide repercussions; and
further, Nasser did not understand all of the Russian
intentions
.
Byroade conveyed this message to Washington; there was
no official reaction. Dulles thought Nasser was bluffing;
Dulles even asked the Russians if they were willing to sell
arms to Egypt. They of course answered "no". Dulles
refused to believe the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal until it
was a reality. When Dulles finally realized that the arms
trsuisfer was a fact, he was furious. He sent special envoys
to persuade Nasser to delay; to convince Nasser that help
was coming. It was too late. Nasser could wait no longer.
Nasser announced the arms deal to the world on September
21, 19 55, one week after the agreement had been signed.
There was a great deal of concern — and fear — among the
Egyptian elite that the United States would try to undermine
48

the transaction and further embarass and weaken Egypt. In
fact, they were correct. The United States tried to talk
Nasser out of the deal for several weeks after the announce-
ment/ but had no success. Nasser stood his ground. Nasser
was on the verge of breaking off diplomatic relations with
the United States on several occasions, but restrained
himself and maintained a calm exterior. The United States
(Dulles) even tried to deliver an ultimatum to Nasser, but
the message was never delivered due to diplomatic circum-
stances. The US special envoy and the Ambassador in Cairo
knew what the consequences of such an ultimatum might be
and therefore did not deliver the note.
The arms dea was firm. This agreement by the Soviet
Union to transfer arms to Egypt in exchcinge for cotton was
the first major building block in the Soviet-Egyptian
alliance.
It is not enough to state that there was an arms deal;
the reader must see the size and scope of the transaction
in order to grasp just how dependent the Republic of Egypt
was to become on Soviet arms and supplies. Conversely, the
Soviets knew that the magnitude of the arms shipments to
Egypt would virtually rebuild the Egyptian military and make
Egypt totally dependent on Soviet replacement parts, resupply,
training, and technology. Nasser insisted that Egypt would
remain independent and that Egypt would resist foreign inter-
vention; however, even Nasser must have realized that the
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Soviet arsenal he was buying would bring direct Soviet
influence int o Egypt's military — from planning to execution
and from logistics to operations.
The initial arms agreement is difficult to sort out from
the second, third, fourth, etc. After the original agreement
in September of 1955, there seems to be a continuous flow of
arms from the Soviet Union to Egypt, This initial build-up
phase lasted from 1955 until 1958. (There was to be another
phase of arms transfer, even larger thein the first, which
would take place from 1964 - 1970.) Although it is difficult
to ascertain exactly what Egypt ordered in the initial deal,
it is possible to document the following shipments. Beginning
in December, 1955, Egypt received (primarily through the port
at Alexandria): 120 USSR T-54 tanks; 200 Czech T-34 tanks;
100 USSR BTR 152 armoured personnel carriers; 50 USSR JSU
152 tank destroyers; 86 USSR MIG-15 fighter aircraft; 39 USSR
IL-28 bombers; 12 USSR motor torpedo boats; 5 USSR "W" class
submarines; 2 USSR Skoryi class destroyers; and 6 USSR mine-
sweepers. Additionally, the Soviet Union sent numerous
advisors and technicians to Egypt, Egypt sent 200 officers
to Poland for schooling, and the Soviet Union supplied the
necessary supplies, training devices, and ammunition.
This list of weapons transferred is compiled from
articles or listings in: The Arab World , Beirut; The Military
Balance
, London; Brassey's Annual , New York; SIPRI, The Arms
Trade Register
, Stockholm.
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It is evident from the list of weapons above that Egypt
was rebuilding her forces from the ground up. Egypt was
past the point of no return; she had committed herself to
dependency on the Soviet Union.
The next layer in the foundation of the Soviet-Egypticin
alliance was constructed of economic aid and technical
assistance.
From the moment that he took, office^ Nasser had been
working to turn his dream of building a high dam at Aswan
into a reality. The dam had a tremendous importance for
Egypt and was necessary for the success of the revolution.
The Aswan High Dam (first seriously discussed in 1953) would
permit the Egyptians to push back the desert for the first
time in history. An additional one and one-half million
acres would be availaible for cultivation. It was necessary
if Egypt was to industrialize; the hydro-electrical plant
would produce ten billion kilowatt hours a year. (In fact,
Egypt would have 50% of the electrical power on the African
continent.) The Aswcui Dam was to be seventeen times the
size of the Great Pyraimid. This dam was to be modern Egypt's
Great Pyramid; it would provide a place in history for Nasser,
his government, and for Egyptian people of the era. (For the
sake of comparison, while the Aswan High Dam was a tremendous
undertaking for Egypt, it was, and is not the largest in the
world. The largest concrete dam is the Grand Coulee; the
highest is reported to be the Nurek in the USSR.)
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Egypt approached the World Bank for the financing. The
World Bank would not undertake to finance the dam on its
own; it went to major participants for help and that is how
the United States and Great -Britain became involved.
Serious negotiations began in late 1955 with many meetings
between Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian Ambassador to Washington,
and Dulles, and between Eugene Black of the World Bank and
Nasser. Hussein pressed Dulles — and the United States —
for a definite commitment. Dulles would not commit himself;
he was still very disturbed about the arms deal. Finally,
however, after Egypt's Finance Minister, Abdel Moneim el-
Kaissouni, participated in extensive talks in London and in
Washington, Dulles declared that the United States was going
to help Egypt. Dulles added that Nasser should think about
the two kinds of aid he was receiving and then decide who
were Egypt's true friends. Nasser apparently had the feeling
that the United States — because of the size and expense of
the project — thought that it could get a firm grip on Egypt
and that the expected duration of the project would allow
the US to offset the Soviet influence with American influence.
The Aswan Dam would require $400 million in foreign
currency; the World Bank would put up one-half cind Britain
and the United States would supply the other half. From the
outset the aid was to be a loan, not a grant. As 1956 began,
the US and Britain announced that they would agree to loan
enough for the first year's work, not the entire amount
required. Dulles insisted that the US Congress would not
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approve the entire amount, and that the aid would have to be
voted on each year. Nasser countered that he could not
begin a project that he might not be able to finish. He
needed a pledge of the entire amount. Nasser suspected
that Dulles was trying to tie Egypt to the United States
for at least ten years in order to try to influence Egypt
each time the loan renewal came up for a vote. Naturally,
Nasser was completely opposed to this plan.
Nasser and the World Bank were able to iron out minor
differences on the terms of the loan and the remaining
obstacle was the United States. At the beginning of 1956
Dulles and the United States seemed sincere about granting
the loan. As the year wore on, however, there came to be
more and more difficulties . Dulles was having a great deal
of trouble with the Congress and with public opinion.
Additionally, the United States was placing conditions on
the loan. In May, 19 56 the Under Secretary of State conveyed
three conditions to Ambassador Hussein. These conditions
were: Egypt would accept all monetary conditions laid down
by the US and Britain; Egypt was to make a declaration
saying that there would be no more arms deals with the
Russians; finally, Egypt was to — somehow — negotiate a peace
between the Arabs and the Israelis. There was no other way
to interpret these conditions than to be intrusions into
Egyptian international and domestic political affairs.
The United States argued that there must be a guarantee
of a return on the investment in both dollars and diplomatic
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points as the US was under tremendous pressure from many
sides not to help the Egyptians. The pressure was applied
by Britain, France, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and from three
United States domestic lobbies — the cotton lobby, the
Israeli lobby, and the Chinese lobby.
Britain had turned against Nasser for his continued
attacks on the Baghdad Pact and for his support of Arab
nationalism in Arab countries which worked contrary to
British interests in the Middle East. The French were
furious over Nasser's support for the Arab nationalists in
North Africa. Turkey, Iran, and Iraq were concerned for
their regimes because of Nasser's support for nationalism
and Nasser's growing following throughout the Middle East.
They feared that eventually Nasser would be able to direct
coups from Cairo and certainly would do so, given his
penchant for Egyptian supremacy and Arab nationalism. The
cotton lobby in the United States opposed the Aswan Dam
because it opposed the expansion of Egyptian cotton produc-
tion. The Israeli lobby was, predictably, against all aid
to Egypt. Finally, the China lobby was incensed over Egypt's
recognition of Communist China. Dulles was under pressure
to back out of the commitment to aid Nasser in building the
High Aswan Dam.
Nasser kept cibreast of these developments through both
news and intelligence sources. As early as April — 1956 —
Nasser felt that the United States would back out of the
deal.
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In June, 1956, M. Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Minister,
visited Egypt for a number of reasons and at the end of the
five day visit Nasser and Shepilov announced that they had
discussed a wide range of topics and that "there was a
complete unity of views". Also, at that time, Shepilov
extended both technical and economic (400,000 L) aid for
the Aswan Dam. Nasser informed him that Egypt was still
engaged in negotiations with the United States and Great
Britain over the aid for the dam.
As the time for a decision on the loan for the Aswan
Dcim drew near — July, 1956 — Ambassador Hussein returned
from Washington to discuss the problem with Nasser. Hussein
related to Nasser that Dulles' difficulty was with the US
Congress. Nasser disagreed; he felt that the difficult was
Dulles. Nasser decided to prove his point by instructing
Hussein to return to Washington and accept all of the
conditions laid down by Dulles and the United States. Nasser
told Hussein that the United States would still back out of
the deal.
Hussein returned to Washington auid en route stopped in
London; there he addressed a news conference and told the
reporters — contrary to Nasser's instructions — what his
mission and purpose was. This news item gave Dulles a
warning of what Hussein would tell him the next day in
Washington, and therefore Dulles was prepared.
At the same moment that Dulles was receiving Hussein, a
prepared news release was read to reporters. The statement
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was that the United States — regretfully — had to withdraw
the offer of aid. Dulles supposedly told Hussein: "Mr.
Ambassador, we are going to issue a statement. I am sorry,
we are not going to help you with the Aswan Dam. . . .We
believe that anybody who builds the High Dam will earn the
hatred of the Egyptian people, because the burden (economic)
will be crushing. The Egyptian people could not take up
such a big project. It is more than Egypt's resources can
bear, especially with the arms commitments. We don't want
to be hated in Egypt, we are leaving this pleasure to the
Soviet Union if they really think they want to do it."
When Nasser read Dulles' statement he regarded it as not
only a withdrawal, but an "attack on the regime" and an
invitation to the Egyptian people to bring down the government,
Nasser decided on his counter move on July 21, 1965; he
was going to nationalize the Suez Canal. In nationalizing
the Suez Canal, a symbol of foreign domination over Egypt,
Nasser thought he could finance the Aswan Dam himself with
the canal's revenues. Nasser was furious over the United
States' withdrawal of aid and immediately launched a bitter
attack on the US ridiculing the American reasons for the
withdrawal. Nasser declared: "We will build the Dam without
the West. . .We will buid the Dam without pressure from any
..12
nation.
"
Heikal, op. cit
.
, pps 66-67.
^The New York Times, July 26, 1956.
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On July 26, 1956, Nasser took his revenge; revenge not
only for the withdrawal of the offer of aid for the Aswan
Dam, but also for the bitter, personal attacks launched
by the British against him for his opposition to the Baghdad
Pact. Nasser and his advisors had correctly calculated that
there would be no immediate reprisals for the takeover of
the Ccinal; they estimated that it would take Britain over
two months to initiate any military action against Egypt.
Nasser's popularity soared. The Canal now belonged to
the Egyptian people. Egyptians felt as though they were now
truly free of foreign domination and Nasser had brought them
this freedom.
The initial response to the nationalization of the Suez
Canal was predictable. The West cried, "Outrage", and the
developing nations shouted, "Hurrahl". The canal operation
continued normally throughout most of the crisis. There was
no immediate military intervention. Eisenhower declared that
the United States would send her ships around the cape if the
canal were closed; further, the U.S. asserted that under no
circumstances would it declare war. Britain's Foreign Office
was dissuaded from military intervention by the High Command.
Mountbatten and Templer convinced Anthony Eden that such a
move would be a disaster. There were several attempts to
settle the Suez crisis through negotiation. Dulles headed
a conference in London which proved fruitless. Robert Menzies,
the Australian Prime Minister, headed a mission to Cairo to
try to convince Nasser that the Canal should be governed by
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an "International Commission". Nasser refused; the Menzies
'
mission also failed.
Even while these peaceful settlements were discussed, the
British continued military preparations for an invasion of
the Suez Canal Zone. In October (1956) the question came
before the United Nations cind eventually a resolution
containing six principles on the administration of the Canal
was adopted. After the resolution was adopted, Nasser
virtually ruled out any possibility of an invasion of the
Canal.
On October 29, 1956, the Israelis (later learned to be
urged on by, and in collusion with, the British) moved an
armoured column across the Sinae with the intention of
drawing the Egyptian armour and army into the desert. Nasser
suspected a British-French-Israeli collcdooration of some kind
and moved his army closer to the Canal to protect it from
invasion. On November 1, the British bombed Cairo; the
objective was the Egyptian Air Force. Britain had estimated
that Nasser would fall; that he would have to succumb to
internal pressure. The reverse came true. There were
massive demonstrations of support not only within Egypt,
but all over the Arab world. The bombing continued and the
Suez Canal situation became an international crisis. Indeed,
world leaders began to fear that another world war was
imminent. The British and French (with the help of the
Israelis) could have undoubtedly crushed the Egyptian army,
but international political pressure on Britain halted the
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invasion. The crisis became a standoff and the argument
was taken to the United Nations
.
The United States and the Soviet Union forced the issue
to the UN, with the Soviets siding with Egypt from the
outset. The Soviets were also very vocal in favor of the
Egyptians, while the United States played a silent, diplo-
matic role. Had not the United States and the USSR "rescued"
Egypt, Nasser surely would have fallen to the British, French,
cund Israeli attack, Arab pride would have suffered enormously,
the Israelis would have held the Sinai, and England would
have held the canal. Instead the reverse was true; Arab
pride soared over the victory in the Canal Zone (the British
were out of Egypt cind Egyptians ran the Ccinal) , Nasser's
popularity and influence grew by leaps and bounds, the
Israelis were forced out of the Sinai, and the Colonialists
were out of Egypt and on their way out of the Middle East
entirely.
The Suez Crisis had many and varied effects on Egyptiain,
Middle Eastern, and world history; of all of these effects,
the following five are most important to this paper: 1) It
established Nasser as the leader of the Arab world (suid
therefore the spokesman for the Arabs) ; 2) It finished the
Baghdad Pact; 3) It reduced British (and Western European)
influence and involvement in the Middle East to zero;
4) It seriously strained whatever relations remained between
Egypt and the United States; 5) It opened the door to
increased USSR involvement and presence in Egypt.
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The Suez Crisis and the subsequent political repercus-
sions drove Egypt further and further from the West. Egypt
could no longer count on help from the West, and indeed,
saw herself as an enemy of Britain, France, and possibly
even the United States. This situation caused a de factor
alliance between Egypt and the Soviet Union and the Soviets
were quick to realize the existence of this "alliance".
Even before the Suez crisis the Soviets recognized
Egypt's value as a stepping stone over containment and as a
rift in the Baghdad Pact. An added attraction of attempting
to gain influence in Egypt was that it was a large populous
country with a relatively powerful armed force and was the
recognized regional leader. Influence in Egypt would quite
possibly lead to influence in other Arab nations.
Through no fault of their own— that is no prior planning
the Soviets enjoyed an "open door" policy in Egypt after the
Suez debacle in 1956. The West had shut themselves out of
Egypt. With the West out of the picture, who else could the
Egyptians turn to for aid and international sponsorship.
The fact is that the only nation capable of helping Egypt
(or any emerging nation) realize her goals was the Soviet
Union, or Communist Bloc.
Between mid 19 55 (the arms deal) and late 1958 (the
Aswan Dam loan) the Soviets devoted a great deal of time,
energy, and money to the Middle East and Egyptian problem.
Khrushchev is considered by the analysts to be the man who
re-oriented Soviet thinking in relation to the Third World.
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Khrushchev began the formal ideological justification for
Soviet-Third World ties at the 20th Party Congress in
February of 1956. Khrushchev largely abandoned the concept
of "capitalist encirclement" as it had been somewhat self
defeating as by implication it regarded the entire non-
Communist world as hostile to the USSR. Instead, Khrushchev
said that a "vast peace zone, including both socialist and
non-socialist peace loving states... has emerged in the
13
world arena." This was a shift from Stalin's bipolar
"tow camp" theory and is thought to be a fundamental change
in Soviet practical foreign policy toward underdeveloped
countries. Egypt was one of the nations mentioned which
had recently won its independence and was in the "peace
zone". The Soviet Premier stated further that these countries
"need not go begging for up to date equipment to their former
oppressors. They can get it in the Socialist countries
14
without assuming any political or military commitments."
Khrushchev also agreed with the position that there was
more than one road a nation could take to realize socialism
and he reaffirmed Lenin's position on peaceful coexistence.
In effect, the Kremlin was officially cinnouncing its inten-
tion to become directly involved in the affairs of Third
World countries where it might be able to capitalize on
13Leo Gruliow, ed. , Current Soviet Policies II, The
Documentary Record of the" 29th Party Congress and Its
AftermathT (New York, 1957) p. 33.
Ibid.
, p. 34
.
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anti-colonial sentiments, internal instability, or strained
external relations.
In 1957 a thorough reappraisal was made of Egypt's 1952
revolution. (It was no longer a military coup.) In revising
the earlier line, the revolution was now said to have enjoyed
strong popular support. The Egyptian army had been solidly
against the old government, the masses were on the side of
the army, and the general population had taken part in the
July uprising. Most of the Egyptian officers had come from
the petty bourgeoise circles, received low pay, and were
linked by family ties to the common, working classes. This
"volte face" coming shortly after the Suez Crisis, acknow-
ledged the fact that the Soviets approved of Nasser's regime,
while at the same time it made the regime more palatable to
Politburo members
.
By the end of 195 8 the official Soviet position was that
Egypt was fertile ground for socialism, that Nasser was in
fact a leader of the masses, cind that Egypt was a potentially
valuable ally. Relations between the USSR and Egypt were
generally good between 1955 and 1958, keeping open the
diplomatic chcinnels for the "total involvement" effort that
began in 19 58.
On February 1, 1958, Egypt and Syria proclaimed the
formation of the "United Arab Republic" — the UAR. This
union of two large Arab nations was an indirect outcome of
the Suez crisis. Arabs now felt more than ever that there was
strength in unity, and that Nasser had the ability, character,
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cind international reputation necessary to lead such a union.
The UAR formation is important to this paper in so far as
it — de facto — drew the Soviets into even deeper involvement
in the Middle East. If the Soviets were going to court
Egypt then they were going to have to court Syria. The
Soviets knew this and went ahead with their Egyptian plans
and were therefore obviously ready for an all out commitment
in the Middle East.
In December of 1958 the USSR and Egypt (the UAR) signed
two important trade agreements. The first was an agreement
whereby the Russians consented to finance and technically
assist in the construction of five airfields, several
factories, and a thermal power plant (at Suez) in Egypt.
(December 22, 1958) The second agreement, signed six days
later was the more important of the two from the Egyptian
point of view. This was the Aswan Dam agreement.
«
(December 28, 1958) The Soviets agreed to supply materials,
technical assistance, technicians, and 400 million roubles
to aid Egypt in the first phase of construction in the Aswan
14High Dam.
With these two deals came a marked increase in Soviet
involvement and presence in Egypt. Both Egypt and Russia
perceived beneficial results from this informal alliance
and as far as both sides were concerned, they were to be
14Arab World, Beirut, December 22 and 28, 1958.
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allies for years to come. Egypt was providing Russia with
a diplomatic foothold and a base of operations in the Middle
East, and the Soviet Union was providing Egypt arms, funds,
and technical assistance that Nasser considered vital to
emergence as a developed nation and as leader of the Arab
world.
From this point, December 1958, until July 1972 (the
date that Sadat expelled the Soviet technicians) the Russian-
Egyptian relationship was to grow to phenomenal proportions,
become more entangling and complex, and from the Egyptian
perspective, more one-sided.
The next watershed in the Egyptian-Soviet relationship
was the war of June, 1967. Between 1958 and 1967 the Russian
presence and influence in Egypt (as indicated above)
continued to grow. The relationship was not without setbacks
or differences of opinion, however. There were continual
accusations by both sides that the other was something less
than an ideal diplomatic partner. Nasser continually accused
the Communists of subterfuge and double dealing. He continued
to imprison Communists and would not permit ciny Communist or
Socialist political activity in Egypt. Nasser never did
trust, or believe in. Communist doctrine or ideology. He
preferred to believe that Egypt and the Soviet Union could
deal with each other pragmatically, with each side entering
into agreements for the mutual benefit of the nation-state
in a real world environment. Nasser separated — at least in
his mind — the Soviet Union as a nation-state and Marxist-
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Leninist Communism as an ideology and as a prime mover in
the USSR. As a result of this differentiation in Nasser's
mind, he saw no contradiction in condemning Communism openly
and criticizing Communists for interference in the Middle
15East affairs, and dealing openly with the Kremlin. Nasser
needed help; he needed physical cind financial assistance and
not an ideology.
The Kremlin on the other hand, particularly Khrushchev,
had a difficult time convincing the Communist* Party members
and the Politburo that Russia needed an Egyptian presence
badly enough to forgive and forget the verbal attacks launched
by Nasser against Communism. There was a definite contradic-
tion in the minds of the Soviet elite between the actions and
the speeches and the intentions of Gamal Nasser.
As the relationship continued to grow — and apparently
prosper — Nasser fell victim to the same kind of criticism
that Khrushchev had been enduring. Close advisors of Nasser —
such as Anwar el-Sadat, Mohammed Heikal, and Mahmoud Fawzi —
cautioned Nasser that Soviet aid and arms and Communism (the
ideology) go hand in hand, that they were inseparable.
Nasser did not believe this and, obviously, continued to deal
with the Soviet Union.
The history of the relationship between Egypt cind the
Soviet Union form 1958 to 1967 is basically characterized
by an ever increasing number of agreements between the two
Arab World, Beirut, March 16 and 22, 1959.
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countries. The two nations concluded agreements on: trade,
diplomatic missions, cultural exchanges, technical and
scientific aid and advice, and tourist trade exchange.
Additionally, mciny visits were exchanged by both the heads
of state and the members of the military and political elite.
After each visit there inevitably followed a joint communique
asserting a unity of goals, purpose, and foreign policy.
These interactions between the two governments served to
enlighten Russians about EgVpt and the Middle East and bring
a small Egyptian presence to Moscow; but, more importantly,
broadened the base of influence and increased the scope and
nature of the Russicin presence in Egypt and the Middle East.
The second stage of Soviet Egyptian relations in the
Nasser era began with the promulgation of the socialist
decisions in July 1961. As Egypt turned to socialism rela-
tions with the Soviet Union became increasingly close. The
Soviets greatly increased economic aid to Egypt and Nasser
was granted the title "Hero of the Soviet Union".
Khrushchev visited the Arab Republic in May 1964; the
first visit by a Kremlin leader to an Arab state. The occa-
sion of the visit was the diversion of the Nile River flow
as a prelude to construction of the High Dam. Italian party
leader Togliatti described Khrushchev's visit as one of the
most important triumphs by the Soviets in Egypt.
Khrushchev's downfall in 1964 removed the man who built
the foundation for good relations between the USSR and Egypt.
It did not affect relations between the two countries.
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Moscow sent a series of leaders to Cairo to reassure Nasser
that a continued policy of cordial relations would be
maintained by the Kremlin. Kosygin visited Cairo in May
1966 to assure the Nasser government that Moscow wanted to
continue its good relations with Egypt.
This reassurance by Kosygin came at the right time for
16Egypt, because the protracted war in Yemen was adversely
affecting the Egyptian economy and the already uncertain
relations with the United States were deteriorating even
further.
The June 1967 war with Israel cemented Egyptisin-Soviet
relations. Their political and economic cooperation became
a fateful alliance with Soviet power as a shield for Egypt.
By the end of the decade, 1970, estimates were that the
Soviets had at least 19,000 military experts in Egypt and
had more than doubled their investment in terms of dollars.
Before the war the Soviets had poured approximately two
billion dollars worth of aid into Egypt; by 19 70 the figure
was four and one half billion dollars.
16
Nasser responded to pleas from the rebel officers of
the Yemeni armed forces and sent planes, arms, and army troops
to Yemen in October 1962; he was unable to withdraw the forces
until after the June 1967 war with Israel. For more detail on
the Yemen war and Egypt's involvement see: Stephens, op. cit. ,
pps 380-410.
17The subject of deteriorating Egyptian-US relations is
not important to the paper at this point. The relations
between Egypt and the United States between 1958 and 1967 did
not concretely affect the growing relationship between the
USSR and Egypt — although they might have, handled differently.
For a good account of these relations from the Egyptian point
of view see: Heikal, op. cit.
,
pps 201-249.
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The minute by minute details of the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war are not critical to this paper. The events leading up
to the war, the Egyptian aind Soviet views of the war — before,
during, and after — and the outcome of the war are important
as they serve to further describe the Egyptian-Soviet alliance
in its maturing stage.
Obviously the root causes of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967
were numerous and varied. However there are a number of
factors that can be cited as immediate causes of the war, or
at least direct contributors to the outbreak of hostilities.
The decade preceding the June 1967 war had been a decade
of turmoil in the Middle East. There were civil clashes and
coups. Violence and upheaval were evident in Lebanon, Syria,
Iraq, Yemen, and all across North Africa. Nationalism was
sweeping the Middle East. Ironically, Nasser's popularity
(based on his actions in the Suez crisis) as the Arab world
leader was ebbing. Egypt had been unable to help the Arab
world unite in the spirity of nationalism; unable to remove
the occupying Israeli forces, unaible to solve the Palestinian
problem, and unable to untan'gie herself from a protracted war
in Yemen. Nasser was criticized sharply in the Arab press
and even by his own political and military elite for not
leading the Arcibs against the Israelis. (Israel not only
occupied Arab soil, but continued — for some reason — probing
spot attacks against both Egypt and Syria.) Nasser and the
Egyptian military were therefore predisposed to engage in
military action against Israel.
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During March and April of 196 7 the situation between
Syria and Israel became very dangerous. The Israelis accused
the Syrians of sending infiltrators onto Israeli soil. Israel
replied that she could and would occupy Dcimascus if necessary.
Naturally, these warnings did not lessen the tension between
Israel and Syria. These minor incidents and rhetoric
exchanges led to border clashes and aerial dogfights. Israel
massed troops in the border and Syria responded in kind. At
this time, late April, Sadat was in Moscow and informed that
Russian intelligence had learned that the Israelis had massed
two brigades on the Syrian border. This intelligence, coupled
with the Israeli threats to occupy Damascus, led Nasser to
conclude that the situation was very grave and out of hand.
Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with Syria and as
a result ordered part of the Egyptiain Army into the Sinai in
order to divert Israeli attention and possibly avoid an
attack on Syria. The situation continued to escalate. It
was at this time that Egypt's Minister of War was in Moscow
for consultations and was told by Kosygin, "We are going to
back you. But you have gained your point. (No attack on
Syria by the Israelis.) You have won a political victory.
18So it is now time to compromise, to work politically."
When Badran reported back to Nasser he gave Nasser the
impression that the USSR was ready to back Egypt to the hilt;
clearly that was not Kosygin ' s meaning.
18Heikal, op. cit.
, p. 242
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As the crisis continued to build, the "international
intelligence network" picked up the idea that Egypt had
prepared to launch an attack against Israel on May 26th.
The United States sent an urgent message to Egypt through
the Soviet Union asking Egypt to reverse that decision. The
Soviet Union was emphatic in their request; the Russian
cimbassador informed Nasser that whoever fired the first shot
would be in an "untenable political position." They (the
Russians) strongly urged Nasser not to fire that first shot
Whether Nasser had in fact ordered an attack (which is
doubtful at best) is immaterial. Nasser had to pause and
wonder about such council from an ally that was going to
"back him to the hilt" . Nasser made several speeches in
the aggressor and fire the first shot that sent the Middle
East back to war.
At the same time that the United States was exhorting
Nasser to back down and restore peace and stability to the
area, United States military presence and activity increased
noticeably throughout the Middle East. US warships traversed
the Suez Canal in order to join the Sixth Fleet; the Sixth
Fleet itself begcin to maneuver into position to evacuate
Americans from the Eastern Mediterranean cind support and
resupply its client (Israel) ; and US planes began to fly
reconnaisscince missions over Syria, Egypt, and Israel.
Egypt (and the Arab world in general) was very disturbed over
American participation in the crisis and was convinced
(correctly) that the United States would not let Israel
fall to the Arab forces.
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The Russian presence, on the other hand, was quite
limited. The Soviets were very disturbed over the inten-
sity of the crisis, but chose to remain outside the conflict,
save for advising Egypt to back down and restore stability.
The Soviets therefore, were not as noticeable or obnoxious
as the Americans and seemed to be the true friends of the
Arcibs . Nasser was still very suspicious and puzzled over
the Soviet advice to negotiate a peaceful settlement, and
over the lack of actual support the Russians were giving
Egypt and Syria. Surely his friends and allies in the
Kremlin would agree with Nasser and advocate military action
if necessary.
The Third Arab-Israeli war began at 8:45 AM (Cairo
time) on Monday, June 5th, 1967. It was virtually won by
Israel within the first three hours, perhaps even the first
few minutes. The fighting did not end for six days however,
cuid thousands of lives were lost.
It v;as Israel who fired the first shot. Israel opened
the offensive with an all out attack on Egyptian airfields.
In three hours of raids the Egyptian Air Force was destroyed,
or at least neutralized, leaving the entire Egypt icui Army
with no air support or cover. For whatever reasons —
embarrassment, reluctance to expose their own inadequacy,
or sheer disbelief of the actual enormous losses — the
Egyptian commanders in the field and the intelligence branches
did not report the actual damage or losses or scope of the
first day's action to the Egyptian High Command or to Nasser
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until Monday evening. This delay allowed the Israelis to
maike even further gains in Arab territory and inflict more
dcimage from the air than would have otherwise been possible.
When the actual scope of the disaster was finally compre-
hended by Nasser and the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian
High Commands, they (the Arab leaders) were convinced that
the Israelis had the assistance of at least the intelligence
branches of the US and British military, if not their actual
fighting forces. The result of this belief was a wave of
anti-American and British anger throughout the Arab world
and the breaking of diplomatic relations with the United
States and Great Britain by several Arab nations, including
Egypt.
The loss of the war was inevitable. Nasser and the High
Command knew it. The Egyptians were unable to advance or
take the initiative; they were so mired in complex tactics
and battles that they could not even withdraw in an orderly
fashion; the battlefield scene was chaotic. Moreover, the
Egyptians found their equipment to be inadequate and inferior
to that of the enemy. There was no prospect of help for
Egypt from any other Arab state or from her friends and
allies outside the Middle East — specifically the Soviet
Union. In contrast with 1956 Egypt was not alone, however.
Syria and Jordan had already entered the war, and Iraq,
Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia had all
promised troops. These additional forces were all weak and
unable to organize into effective fighting units in the
short time available.
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Moscow's support for Egypt consisted of: assuring
Nasser that there would be no American intervention (The
Russians did not believe that the US actively participated)
;
public condemnation of Israel; and, diplomatic backing of
Egypt in the UN. This support was obviously far short of
what Nasser needed to save Egypt and the Arabs from another
humiliation and defeat.
The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution
on the 7th of June calling for an immediate cease fire at
8PM on June 7th. Syria and Iraq had rejected the call for
a cease fire, but Egypt accepted the cease fire on June 8th.
By the morning of June 9th the Israeli forces had advanced
to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and the Egyptian High
Commcind announced that they had completed their withdrawal
to the west bank of the Canal. Nasser later admitted that
by June 9th Egypt could no longer defend the Canal. "The
road to Cairo was open and offered no resistance whatever
19due to the paralysis of the armed forces." According to
Nasser the Egyptian Sinai forces lost 10,000 men (soldiers,
1,500 officers, 5000 men and 500 officers taken prisoner,
approximately 700 tanks lost or destroyed, and thousands of
20guns and trucks were lost or destroyed. As previously
19Gamal Nasser; speech of 23 Nov 1967.
20 Ibid . While some analysts believe Arab and Egyptian
losses to be inflated, most other sources agree very closely
with Nasser's statement of losses. (See: Politics in
Uniform ; The Military Balance , 1966, 67, 68; and
Stephens , op. cit. )
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stated, the Air Force had been neutralized at the outset
with losses figured at 340 combat aircraft.
The war was not over. Having finished with Egypt,
Israel turned to Syria. The Israelis bombed Syrian positions
on June 8th and 9th. Israel stormed the Golan Heights on
the moiming of June 9th and the next day the Syrians abandoned
their positions and withdrew to Damascus. The Israelis and
the Syrians accepted a cease fire on the afternoon of June
10th. The Six Day War was over.
It was Nasser's darkest hour.
The public was slow to grasp the full extent of the
disaster. When Nasser announced the cease-fire it came as
a shock and served to arouse anger and criticism of Nasser.
The public could not understand why the army had given up
so soon.
Nasser's work of fifteen years — the liberation of
Egypt from foreign troops, the establishment of Egyptian
control of the Suez Canal, the rebuilding of national self-
confidence — seemed to collapse in three ruinous days
.
For the purposes of this paper, one of the most important
points to remember is that Nasser firmly believed that the
United States and Britain were actively helping the enemy
while the Soviet Union did nothing to stop them or materially
help Egypt.
Additionally, world opinion seemed to be — indeed was --
against the Arabs after the war. The Arabs were pictured
as cowards, as losers, as unheroic, and as the aggressors.
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The Western press, especially France euid Britain, played
up these characterizations of the Arabs as true in retaliation
for their expulsion from the Middle East. The Israelis were
successful in spreading this image throughout the world
through a massive propaganda campaign. The Russians, to
Nasser's dismay, were unable, or unwilling, or both, to stem
this tide of anti-Arab sentiment cind propaganda.
Nasser came near to nervous and physical collapse when
confronted with all of this bad news. He saw no way out of
the dilemma for himself or for Egypt. Some of his closest
advisors including Vice-President Mohieddin, urged Nasser to
seek an understanding and reconciliation with the United
21States as the only possible solution. Nasser chose another
course. He decided on accepting full public responsibility
for the war and its outcome, and on insisting that the Soviet
Union make good on some of its promises. He also intended to
resign the Presidency on the ninth of June during a nation-
wide radio and television address.
His speech of that evening was eloquent and obviously
moving. He spoke of the war as only a setback; he declared
that this was an hour of "action and not of sadness". He
extolled the virtues and bravery of the army and criticized
the world powers for their parts in the war and particularly
the USSR for not coming to the aid of their new Arab allies.
21Stephens, op. cit
.
, p. 505
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Even before Nasser had finished speaking the people began
to pour out into the streets shouting, "Nasser, Nasser, don't
leave us, we need youl" The streets of Cairo were full of
citizens all demanding that Nasser stay on as President. He
did.
The unbelievcible amoiiint of support that Nasser received
during those few days astounded both Eastern and Western
analysts. The West thought that this was a perfect oppor-
tunity for the people of Egypt to rid themselves of a dic-
tator. The East though that the Arabs would like to rid
themselves of a leader who failed them. Both sides were —
at first — unable to comprehend the pro-Nasser sentiment
that swept Egypt. The West finally deduced that perhaps
Nasser was not a dictator, at least not in the mold that
the West had cast for him, and the East began to realize
that the popular support was for Nasser the man and leader,
not Nasser "the loser". The Arabs knew that Nasser could
cind would lead them to greater heights and did not blame
him for the disaster of the Six Day War.
Both East and West attempted to capitalize on this new
wave of Nasserism in the Middle East. The West made over-
tures or renewed diplomatic relations and aid, but, at
first, the offers fell on deaf ears. The East — Russia —
offered increased support for Nasser and Egypt (eager to be
associated with a leader of the masses who enjoyed so much
popularity and loyalty) and promised to make good all of
Egypt's war losses.
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since Nasser was distrustful and suspicious of the West,
and since the Soviet Union was already "in" Egypt, Russia
was again able to further enhance her position in Egypt.
Nasser faced four formidable tasks in the aftermath of
the war: to rebuild Egypt's military strength; to seek a
diplomatic settlement of the war; to unify the Arab front
in support of Egypt; and to hold the country (Egypt) to-
gether politically and economically. It was clear to Nasser
that the Soviet Union could be of direct assistance in three
of these areas, if not all four.
The Soviets wasted no time in responding. The Kremlin
sent President Podgorny to Cairo a few days after the cease-
fire to discuss the areas of possible assistance with Nasser.
Podgorny promised military, economic, and diplomatic aid
to Egypt as well as propaganda and "public relations" aid
throughout the world in order to counter the bad press that
Egypt and the Arabs received after the war. Podgorny asserted
that the Soviet Union would assist Egypt up to the point of
actual military intervention or the breaking of ties with
the United States; anything up to that line was possible as
far as the Soviets were concerned.
Nasser pressed the Soviets not only for arms but also
for increased Soviet military and technical personnel; he
realized that at least part of the armed forces ' problem
was lack of military competence and technical expertise.
They needed to regain confidence in themselves and a renewed
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esprit de corps. Within four months of the war about 80% of
Egypt's losses had been replaced. New weapons were intro-
duced into the Egyptian arsenal and Soviet military advisors
numbering some 500 before the war — were increased to at
22least 3,000 officers. Never, with the exception of Cuba,
had the Soviet Union deployed such a large number of its
own military personnel outside the Warsaw Pact area. By
October of 196 8, the value of Soviet arms deliveries to
23
Egypt since June, 1967 was estimated at $1.4 billion.
In the months that followed the Six Day War, Moscow
repeatedly urged Nasser to reorganize the Egyptian command
structure, indoctrinate new officers, and broaden the base
of experience of the Egyptian armed forces. Nasser finally
agreed to the changes suggested by the Soviets and replaced
over 600 officers including Marshal Amer, the Chief of
Staff of the Egyptian armed forces. It was obvious that
the Kremlin had gained considerable influence in Egyptian
internal military affairs.
Egypt's defeat caused great consternation cuid embarrass-
ment for the Soviet leaders in Moscow, but for reasons out-
lined above, as well as pure pragmatic ones, the Soviets
continued to support Nasser. Had the Soviets backed out on
22Joshua, op. cit.
,
pps 12-14.
23Walter Laqueur, Confrontation; The Middle East and
World Politics, (Quadrangle, New York, 1974) p 82.
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Egypt it would have had an adverse effect on other Soviet
aligned and certain non-committed nations around the world;
additionally, a Soviet pull-out would allow Red China an
opportunity to unleash propaganda attacks on Moscow as well
as a chance to gain a physical presence in Egypt herself.
The Kremlin leaders obviously decided that the quickest
and surest method to regain lost ground in the Middle East
and garner an even greater degree of control in Egypt was
to continue the flow of Soviet weapons to Egypt.
From mid June 19 6 7 until Nasser's death in September,
1970, the most outstanding feature of the Soviet-Egyptian
relationship was the ever increasing arms buildup of Egypt's
armed forces, combined with a tremendous influx of Soviet
technicians cuid advisors. By 1968 Russian crews were flying
their aircraft from Egyptian airfields and the Soviets con-
trolled at least six air bases by 1970. Shortly before
Nasser's death the Soviets had begun to install a sophis-
ticated surface to air missile (SAM) system in Egypt. This
move by the Russians created cin even greater need in Egypt
for Soviet techniciams and military advisors, as well as
Soviet assistance in the plcuining of Egypt's military
strategy. (The system also served to defend against the
tremendous losses of aircraft that the Egyptians suffered
not only during the Six Day War, but also after the cease-
fire in Nasser's "war of attrition". The Soviets could not
afford to continue to replace aircraft at such a phenomenal
rate; the Egyptians had lost over 150 planes since the end
of the war.)
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The arms shipments were clearly the critical factor
that preserved Soviet prestige and influence in Egypt,
Moscow also sent emergency food and medical supplies, and
extended short term credit for wheat. Although no new
economic agreements were negotiated, the old programs which
were still in progress continued on schedule.
In further support, Soviet warships started to make
regular calls at Egyptian ports. While the Russians were
careful to avoid acquiring naval bases in Egypt (they did
acquire land bases as mentioned above) , they did obtain
the rights to harbor facilities and subsequently greatly
increased their Mediterranean fleet.
Wynfred Joshua analyzes the outcome of the Six Day
War thusly:
"Thus Moscow emerged from the 196 7 Middle
East crisis with its ties to Cairo greatly
reinforced. To the extent that Egypt's
dependence on the USSR had deepened, Moscow's
leverage over Cairo had substantially in-
creased. Admittedly, the Russians did not
fully control Nasser, but his freedom to
maneuver was limited at best. It would be
unlikely that the UAR would pursue a course
that would alienate its only effective backer
and surely not as long as it needed Russian
arms. Since the spring of 19 70 the use of
Russian pilots in combat missions to
strengthen Egyptism air defenses has increased
Russian leverage even more. The major victor
of the Six Day War, therefore, turned out
to be the Soviet Union. "24
Joshua, op. cit. p 14.
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While Joshua's conclusion could not be any more accur-
ate, it was true only for that specific time in the Russian-
Egyptian relationship. For with the death of Nasser the
relationship changed; not at first, but relentlessly and
inevitab)ly as Nasser's successor, Anwar el-Sadat, gained
complete control of the Egyptian government. They did not
know it or realize it at the time, but the Soviets had
already sown the seeds of their downfall in Egypt.
On the evening of September 28, 1970 Nasser died, and
his death marked the beginning of the end of Soviet influence
in Egypt.
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V. SADAT AND THE SOVIETS
There was a great deal of concern around the world over
who would succeed Nasser. To the outside world there were
many possibilities. The fears and anxieties of the leaders
of the world proved unfounded however, as Anwar el-Sadat
came to power. For the most part the transition of power
from Nasser to Sadat was smooth and orderly. All of the
potential rivals for the Presidency met, and along with
the High Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union
and the National Assembly they nominated Sadat to succeed
Nasser. (Sadat was the First Vice-President at the time
and the Egyptian Constitution calls for his succession to
the Presidency.) Sadat was confirmed in office by a
national plebiscite on October 15, 1970.
Although Sadat was a personal friend of Nasser, a mem-
ber of the original revolutionaries of 1952, and the First
Vice-President of the country, he was not privy to all of
Nasser's decisions and meetings on foreign policy matters.
As a result, he was more of an outside observer, and as
time would show, had his own ideas about the nature and
conduct of Egyptian foreign policy.
Robert Stephens has observed that Nasser could have sent
the Russians home at any time if he wanted to pay the price. —
Stephens, op. cit. p. 570
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The price would have been the weakening of Egypt's defenses
because of the probable loss of Soviet military and economic
aid. Nasser had repeatedly stated that Egypt needed to be
militarily strong — for obvious reasons — and the leader of
the Arab world; knowing that to be true we can conclude
that Nasser would not have expelled the Russians. In fact,
when Sadat came to power, the Soviets were at their peak of
physical presence, power and influence in Egypt and in the
Middle East.
Just prior to Nasser's death (Summer of 1970) the
Russians had an unbelievable military presence in Egypt.
By June 1970, the Soviets had: at least 45 SAM-3 sites
ranging from Aswan to Alexandria (manned by Russians); at
least six Russian manned airfields; a military highway
between Cairo and Alexandria for transporting mainly Russian
supplies; a naval base at Alexandria; and air-defense head-
quarters at Baltim; a military headquarters at Cairo; aind
cm enormous land area nearly 220 miles square in the North-
west comer of Egypt which was completely under Soviet con-
2trol and off-limits to everyone else, including Egyptians.
One of Newsweek 's senior editors, Arnaud de Borchgrave,
described the Russisui presence amd involvement thusly:
"... By the time this network is com-
pleted (the SAM site construction project)
the Russians plan to have 4 80 new surface-
to-air missiles in place, manned by some
2Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Red Star over the Nile,"
Newsweek^ June 1, 1970, pps 38-42.
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15,000 Soviet military personnel. Including
the 3,000 military advisors and the 2,500
civilians who were already there before the
SAM- 3 buildup began, more than 20,000 Russians
should be in Egypt by the end of the year,
and one well connected military attache in
Cairo puts the figure as high as 2 8,000.
"Moscow, in short, is beginning to run the
show. In theory, the Egyptian continue to be
responsible for their own airspace. In prac-
tice, however, a Russian general and his staff
will now mcike all the decisions, and the Soviet
personnel will do most of the firing. Russians
will decide, for example, how an intruder is
to be engaged — whether by Egyptian or Russiaji
flown MIG-21 interceptors, or by Egyptian manned
SAM-25, or by Russian manned SAM- 3s, or by
Russian manned and Egyptian fired 100mm anti-
aircraft guns (which will soon ring every key
military site in Egypt) . On the ground and
in the air, the Russians operate and defend
their own installations. They have deployed
machine gun nests and sown mines against an
Israeli ground attack. They have taken over
early-warning radar, including some installa-
tions close to the canal. And to cap it all,
they have set up their own communications system,
which keeps U.S. listening posts on Cyprus
working around the clock.
"Evidently, the Soviets have decided that
even with thorough training the Egyptians are
not capable of operating the highly complex
gadgetry of a modern air defense network. 'An
Egyptian University graduate would require
two years of training in the Soviet Union
before he could fit into the system* , explains
one Russian. 'And there isn't time'. ...
"The Russians have also taken over a vast
tract between Matruh and the Libyan border,
putting a Soviet general in command. Russian
dredgers are deepening the harbor at Matruh.
And the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister and
the naval chief of staff have put the arm on
Nasser to persuade Libya's Col. Muammar Kaddafi
to give the Soviets naval facilities at Tobruk
and an air base at El Adem — both recently
evacuated by the British. Encouraged by the
French to resist, Kaddafi is said to be
equivocating. He told Nasser at an all-night
meeting in Cairo that he didn't get rid of
the Americans and the British just to turn
his country over to the Russians.
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"Such qualms are shared by many educated
Egyptians, as well. Says a Cairo journalist,
'How we will ever get rid of the Russians is
a question we ask each other all the time'.
In fact, there are various signs that the
Soviet presence in Egypt in Egypt is getting
a little too close for political comfort. In
a classic balancing act, Nasser revamped his
Ccibinet, moving several well-known anti-
Communists into important positions. And
the Egyptian President's long-waged campaign
against internal Communists shows no signs
of slackening.
"Even so, the Soviets have made their inten-
tions clear: they will not let the Egyptians
go down to defeat again, even if they have to
run the country themselves to prevent it.
Why has Moscow moved as far and as fast as it
has? Most veteran diplomats in Cairo feel
that the Soviets had no choice. After fifteen
years of heavy investment, they could not afford
to see Nasser's regime go down the drain — a
distinct possibility had Israel's deep pene-
tration raids in Egypt's heartland gone on
unabated. Further humiliation in Egypt could
also have dire consequences for the men in
the Kremlin — the same men who kicked out Nikita
Khrushchev, in part for the humiliation Russia
suffered in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
To put it bluntly, Egypt has now become as
important to Moscow as Czechoslovakia was in
1968, and the Russians are determined to keep
their stake alive, "3
The vast military presence was not the only concrete
link between Moscow and Cairo. By 1970 the Russians had
established numerous economic ties and treaties with Egypt,
and indeed Egypt depended to a great extent on Soviet trade
for its very existence. Frederick Cox, writing in the
Naval War College Review , adequately describes the "Soviet
Economic and Industrial Satellite in Egypt"
.
3Arnaud de Borchgrave , "Red Star over the Nile", o]
cit. pps 38-42.
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"Besides establishing themselves authori-
tatively in the military organization, the
Russians have also gradually assisted Nasser
in constructing an economic satellite along
the Nile, which, during the next decade, could
produce a self-sufficient gas, iron, steel,
and oil complex capable of supplying the needs
of the African Continent. Nasser has attempted,
since 1960 and the inauguration of the first
Five Year Plan, to industrialize and diversify
the domestic economy with Soviet aid. The year
1968 marked the 10th anniversary of the first
USSR-United Arab Republic economic and technical
cooperation agreement. During the past decade,
the Russiams have posted to Cairo over 2,000
technicians with the net result that the economic
and industrial planning is being regulated by
Soviet engineers. The Russian aid missions
have facilitated the process with the building
of the High Dam at Aswan, the showpiece of the
Nile, and the revamping of the Helwan steel and
iron complex near Cairo. The former is nearing
completion; the latter is underway; both pro-
jects are directly supervised by the Russians.
"The show piece of the Russian-Egyptian indus-
trial cooperation, at a cost of $902 million
is the High Dam at Aswan, begun in 1960 and
scheduled for completion by 1969.
"... However, the momentous industrial news
of 196 8 was the agreement between the United
Arab Republic and the USSR in May to build a
$946 million extension to the steel plant at
Helwan, near Cairo. The project which began
during the summer, brought a huge influx of
Russian, Bulgarian, and East German engineers
into Cairo with their families and belongings.
This is the largest industrial undertaking that
the Russians have participated in since the
inception of the High Dam, and will make the
Helwan complex, when completed, the biggest
on the African Continent, increasing production
from 250,000 tons of steel a year to 1.5 million.
It includes a steel sheet rolling mill as well
as a fertilizer plant, using waste residues from
the steel mill, public utilities, services, and
houses for 12,000 steel and iron workers.
"... The Aswan Dam and the Helwan steel and
iron complex form two sides of a Soviet indus-
trial triangle being constructed in Egypt. The
third side is based on the magniticent discovery
of high grade iron ore from mines situated in
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the Bahariya Oasis, north of Aswan in the
western desert. The Soviet-Egyptian plan is
to build an integrated industrial core using
the electrical power from Aswan, the iron ore
from Bahariya, and the steel from Helwan coupled
with the natural gas in the delta which will
be sufficient, not only to supply Egyptian needs,
but of quality and quantity for export in Africa.
"... The latest of the Russian endeavors in
Egypt is the prospecting for oil. The USSR
needs Middle East oil for its Eastern European
satellites which prompted Russia in 1967 to sign
an oil pact providing for technical assistance
in drilling for oil in the western desert near
the Siwa Oasis
.
"... Credit facilities have also been extended
by the USSR for other industrial and agricultural
developments in Egypt, totaling some $800 million.
Trade protocols were signed in 1968 which called
for exchanges worth up to $2 86 million, including
import commodities such as wheat, machinery, and
industrial equipment cind export items in terms
of clothing, footwear, furniture, and cotton.
Since 1967 Russia has supplied the Egyptians with
most of its wheat and foodstuffs. A tourist
protocol was signed in January, 1968 in Moscow,
which provided that 20,000 Soviet tourists a
year would take their vacations along the Nile,
as guests of the Russian government. East Ger-
mans, Bulgarians, Czechs, and Yugoslavs have
supplanted the British, French, and Americans who
used to winter in Egypt. Trade and tourism with
the Soviet bloc nations have been of decisive
importance to the economy since June 196 7 with
industrial production rising by 14 percent for
1968-69.
"In the Middle East, since 1958 and the first
trade pact between the Russians and the Egyptians,
the Soviet bloc countries have become the major
source of credits for the Arab countries. Hun-
dreds of millions of dollars worth of armaments
and credits for development projects, in addition
to the Aswan and Helwan complexes , have been pro-
vided. As a consequence, Egyptian productivity
is being diverted from Western markets to Soviet
bloc countries, and Communist goods and services
are flooding the United Arab Republic. What is
most significant is that the new trading relations
have enabled the Egyptians to reduce considerably
their trade deficit in 1967-69. There has been
a reversal of trade relations between the Arab
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world and the West during the past ten
years; the net result is that Egypt, the
most populous an potentially rich of all
the Arab nations, along with Syria, Iraq,
and Algeria are becoming Soviet economic-
military enclaves in the eastern Medi-
terranean in an area where there are vital
American interests. Baring some unlikely
developments, some observers see the Arab
Middle East gradually slipping into a
Soviet hegemony that ultimately must
result in an American retreat in the region
or a direct confrontation of the super-
powers as a result of a miscalculation or
another Arab-Israeli crisis.'"^
From the outset it appeared that Sadat would follow in
Nasser's footsteps. The Soviet's were naturally wary when
they learned of Nasser's death and Sadat's accession to
the Preidency; Nasser was "their man", but Sadat was an
unknown quantity.
Sadat wasted no time in eliminating his opposition. In
November, 1970, he named a new cabinet with members more
favorable to his own views and position. He repeatedly
stated his intentions to continue the work of the revolu-
tion and follow Nasser's path to Egyptian supremacy, Arab
unity, and freedom from Israeli aggression. Sadat inherited
not only Nasser's goals and dreams, but also his problems.
Egypt was still devastated from the 19 67 war. Egyptian
lands were occupied by the Israelis, the economy was on the
verge of collapse, the military was still weak and rebuilding.
4Frederick J. Cox, "The Russian Presence in Egypt",
Naval War College Review, February, 1970, pps 45-51.
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the ceasefire agreement was about to expire (February 5,
1971) , the Palestinian problem was seemingly insoluable,
and the Arab nations were as divided as they had ever been.
This was clearly not the time for sweeping foreign policy
changes and Sadat knew it.
Sadat had no choice but to work on all of the above
problems simultaneously as they were all interrelated. His
most pressing problem was, of course, the Israeli problem.
He had but two choices, war or political settlement. Before
his death Nasser told the people that they must be ready
for war, but he pursued a political settlement. Sadat
followed this policy of political settlement. This was
not purely an Egyptian decision, but Soviet advice as well.
Ever since the disastrous defeat of 1967 the Soviets
had advised the Egyptians to pursue a peaceful, political
settlement to the Middle East problem. Their reasons were
obviously selfish; they could not afford to actively engage
in a war against Israel and thereby risk a superpower con-
frontation, and secondly, they could not afford to have
Egypt defeated again thereby causing a great deal of embarr-
assment to the Soviet Union and requiring once again a
massive resupply of arms and supplies. On the other hand
the Soviets could not afford not to back Egypt. Non-support
of Egypt, an ally, would have detrimental, far-reaching,
worldwide consequences and would certainly spell the end of
Soviet presence in Egypt cind perhaps even the Middle East.
The only option open to the Soviets was to support Egypt
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in a policy of peaceful, political settlement of the Middle
East crisis. This then was the policy that Sadat followed
and the situation seemed stable for a time; the Soviets
continued their military, economic, and technical aid to
Egypt.
It was, hot long however ,_before signs of unrest and discon-
tentment began to show up in the Egyptian-Soviet relation-
ship. In the Spring of 1971 Sadat began to make references
to the "centers of power" within Egypt. It was clear that
he was refering to the groups that had their own views on
the conduct of Egyptian affairs, both domestic and foreign.
These groups also had the potential power to oust Sadat
from office. Several distinct factions emerged; there
were those who supported Sadat; there were those who wanted
immediate military action against Israel; there were those
who wanted the Russians out of Egypt because of their policy
of no peace, no war; and there were those who favored a
return to the V7est for both aid and intervention.
At the same time that Sadat was confronted with these
challenges to his power, he was fonnulating his own new
approach to the Arab-Israeli problem. Sadat's re-evaluation
of the Middle East crisis took into account the objections
and criticisms of the factions mentioned above. It is evi-
dent from Sadat's speeches and actions of the Spring and
Summer of 1971 that he carefully thought through Egypt's
two possible courses of action with relation to the Middle
East Arab-Israeli crisis. Sadat reasoned that if he opted
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for war, then his only strong ally — the USSR — would not
back him and Egypt was not strong enough to venture into
a war without the assurance of support and resupply from
Russia. (The other strong Arab states, primarily Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States, would not actively support
Egypt because of her ties with the Soviet Union — they were
and are vehemently anti-Communist — and because of the
5bitterness left by Nasser, )
This left Egypt with only a political option open to
settle the crisis. Sadat realized that the Soviets would
be little help in obtaining a political solution. The
Soviets did not have any influence in Israel, and no amount
of rhetoric in the United Nations or in any other world
forum was going to bring about a political solution, Egypt
needed a strong, resourceful, influential, and concerned
mediator for the Middle Wast crisis. That mediator was the
United States, The United States definitely had influence
in Israel, could restrain Israel if necessary, and was
committed to a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis.
In what can now be analyzed as an attempt to patch up
the differences between the United States and Egypt, Secretary
of State William Rogers was invited to Egypt — in conjunction
5Nasser continually attacked the other Arab leaders
and nations as weak, incapable, and unconcerned over the
Arab plight. Only after the loss in 1967 did Nasser apologize
to the Arab leaders and mollify his position in order to
get funds from them in order to pay for Soviet weapons.
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with an extensive Middle East tour — in May 19 71, Just
prior to Roger's visit President Sadat removed Ali Sabry
as First Vice President. Sabry was known to be close to
Moscow and opposed reconciliation with the West, at least
at that time. This move seemed to indicate that Sadat was
very serious about his intentions to try to enlist the help
of the US in the Mddle East peace solution. The removal
of Sabry disturbed the Soviets a great deal. (There were
other reasons why Sadat removed Sabry; it is the timing of
the move that is significant here.)
Quite naturally and predictably, nothing of real impor-
tance came out of the talks between Sadat and Rogers. The
two leaders expressed the positions of their respective
governments and vowed to review all of the factors in the
Middle East crisis in order to try to achieve a peace
settlement. Rogers reaffirmed United States support for
Israel and Sadat left no doubt that Egypt intended to
regain the land and the pride lost in the 1967 war.
The significance of the meeting then, was the fact
that Rogers visited Egypt, and did so by invitation. Offi-
cial visits by high ranking officials are always the first
step in the normalization of relations and nothing of any
consequence comes out of these initial meetings. However,
the Soviets were very interested in the Roger's visit.
They expressed their disapproval and disdain in no uncer-
tain terms. The Soviets v/ere also upset over the removal
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of Ali Sabry. The Kremlin was openly concerned that Soviet
influence might be challenged by the United States,
On May 27, 19 71, as if to quell Russian fears about
losing their influence, Egypt signed a "Treaty of Friend-
ship and Cooperation" with the Soviet Union. Obviously
this treat was not conceived and concluded in less than
a month, rather, it had been in the offing for quite some
time. It happened that May, 19 71 was the most advantageous
time for both parties to sign the treaty.
This "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" was seen
at the time to be the most important occurrence in Soviet-
Egyptian relations since 1955. It was viewed with great
concern and even alarm in the West. (The treaty proved to
be much less significant than originally thought; a point
brought out later in this chapter.) The treaty was much
like the cooperation and assistance treaties that the USSR
had concluded earlier with India and with the Eastern
European countries.
The treaty contained twelve articles which basically
stated that both sides had mutual goals and would cooperate
on all matters of concern to both countries . The treaty
was more rhetoric than substance, but did contain several
key provisions, specifically articles 7, 8, and 9. Article
7 commits both parties to consult together "on all important
questions affecting the interests of both states". The
article further states, "... if a danger to peace or violation
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to peace arises," the two nations "will contact each other
without delay in order to concert their positions with a
view to removing the threat that has arisen for restoring
peace."
Article 8 states in a non-specific manner that Russia
and Egypt "will continue to develop cooperation in the
military field."
Article 9 provides that, "each of the contracting parties
declares that it will not enter any alliance nor join any
international grouping directed against the other contracting
party." This article was unique to the Egyptian treaty
and reflected the Kremlin fear that Cairo might enter an
alliance with the United States or some other Western nation,
which of course, would be directly contrary to Soviet inter-
ests. Initially Egypt did not take the article literally,
but as time passed the Soviets pressed the issue, thereby
restricting Egypt's freedom of action in the international
arena.
Official U.S. reaction to the treaty was cool. The
United States felt the treaty was in keeping with the Soviet
operational code and was basically just a foundation for
ideological propaganda. However, upon closer examination,
it is clear from the reduced level of intercourse between
the U.S. cind Egypt after the treaty, that this document —
specifically article 9 — helped to undermine the attempt
by the United States and Egypt to normalize relations.
Before the treaty the United States could hope to gain
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influence for itself in Egypt at the expense of the Soviets
by bringing power to bear on the Israelis . After the
treaty the United States could no longer realistically
hope to replace Soviet influence, at least in the near
future
.
The treaty did serve to soothe over the differences
that had arisen between Egypt and the Soviet Union, Addi-
tionally, it helped to quiet the domestic storms of politi-
cal unrest in the two countries. In Moscow the conclusion
of the treaty seemed to dispell the fears of the party
leaders that Egypt was turning to the West; Egypt seemed
to be firmly back in the fold. In Cairo, Sadat had been
under great pressure to do something positive about the
1967 defeat and the subsequent occupied lands. The treaty
served to show Sadat's critics that he was successful in
getting the Russians to commit themselves on paper to back
Egypt in her struggle with Israel. Article 8 of the treaty
was originally viewed in Cairo as a promise of future Soviet
military aid and training and article 7 reaffirmed Moscow's
intention of coming to the aid of Egypt if "peace was
threatened." The Russian-Egyptian alliance was stronger
than ever, and perhaps even at its pesik upon the signing
of the "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" in 1971.
Relations between Moscow and Cairo were further enhanced
by President Sadat's visit to the Soviet capital in October,
1971. A joint communique issued by Russia and Egypt re-
iterated the common goals of the two countries in the Middle
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East/ and, additionally, contained promises of arms and
aid for Egypt. While the visit and the communique streng-
thened Russian-Egyptian relations, they cooled United
States-Egyptian relations. Sadat had already publically
stated that the US had backed down on promises of mediating
a Middle East peace and had changed its (US's) conditions
for a Middle East peace. The renewed promise of arms for
Egypt brought immediate criticism from the United States
Secretary of State, William Rogers, and from President
Nixon. The official United States position was that in-
creased aid to Egypt would create an unstable situation
and cause the US to increase aid to Israel, and would
therefore start a new Middle East arms race.
By the end of 19 71 it seemed that Moscow had weathered
the storm that grew up at the beginning of the year. Soviet
influence in the Middle East was still strong and the United
States was still at odds with the Arab countries. Yet
Sadat and Egypt still had no peace settlement, the Israe-
lis still occupied Arab lands, and there had not been any
increased aid from the Soviet Union. When the year ended,
Sadat was again under pressure to "do something" about the
Russians, the Israelis, the economy, and the wecik Egyptian
military. Sadat had promised that 1971 would be the "Year
of Decision"; there was no decision.
1972 did not promise to be any brighter for Sadat
The domestic unrest that was evident in 1971 was about to
boil over in 1972. This unrest was most apparent in the
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military. Sadat was forced to resort to stem measures in
dealing with those who opposed his policies. Yet he knew
that he must gain some measure of success immediately toward
at least one of Egypt's objectives or both he and Egypt
would be lost.
The United States' actions in the Middle East late in
January served to increase the pressure on Sadat. The US
stepped up its aid program to Israel, and by so doing,
virtually announced to the Arab world that there was no
way the Arabs would be able to defeat the Israelis and
therefore the Arab nations should agree to face-to-face
bargaining with the Israelis. Russia did not counter the
United States program in the Middle East; Russia did not
increase the military aid to Egypt, nor did she deliver any
of the new weapons systems she had been promising. This
growing military imbalemce and the non-support by the Soviet
Union placed Sadat in an untenable position. The mounting
internal pressure and the seriousness of the Arab-Israeli
crisis forced Sadat to visit Moscow in February (19 72) to
try to seek out some reason why the Soviets had not supplied
the requested military hardware and why they had not brought
some pressure to bear on the United States to slow the
flow on arms emd aid to Israel.
On the occasion of Sadat's return from Moscow, Egyptians
looked for some new purpose cind vigor in the Egyptian pre-
parations for war. When none came, public dismay and dis-
content was evident throughout the country. The Egyptians
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felt that their plight was similar to that of India; they
concluded that India had won its battle with Pakistan
because of Soviet military aid. Why was there no aid for
Egypt? Egyptians began to see their country as the loser
in the Soviet-Egyptian partnership. Throughout the Spring
of 1972 Sadat tried to dispell the fears and rumors that
the Soviets were not the friends of the Egyptians. He
defended the attitudes of the Soviets; Sadat emphasized
the uniqueness of the Egyptian-Soviet alliance and point
out that what was good for other Soviet partners was not
necessarily good for Egypt.
Sadat visited Moscow again between August 27th and 29th
to reiterate his requests. Just prior to the President's
departure for Moscow, General Ali Baghdadi was removed as
Commander of the Air Force and installed as Minister of
Civil Aviation. General Husni Mubarek replaced Ali Baghdadi
The move was reported as a promotion for Baghdadi yet it
g
was not seen in that light by the political observers.
There was persistent friction between the Egyptisin military
and the Soviet advisors amd technicians, and Mubarek was
known to be more pro-Moscow than Baghdadi. Observers felt
that this move, on the eve of Sadat's Moscow trip, was to
appease the kings in Kremlin.
"Sadat: Same Old Motives", An Nahar Arab Report
,
May 1, 1972, Vol. 3, No. 18, pps 1,2.
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The two governments issued the usual communique at
the conclusion of the talks. The communique was, as
usual, simply rhetoric. It reaffirmed the positions of
the two governments and reiterated the 19 71 Treaty of Friend-
ship and Cooperation. Nothing concrete (military aid)
came out of the Sadat visit. Nevertheless, Sadat continued
to defend the Soviet-Egyptian alliance. He defended the
Kremlin so often and at such length that observers began
to feel that Sadat was no only trying to convince the
people, but himself as well.
The first crack in the Sadat facade occurred during
the first week of May. Sadat admitted that he was not
receiving all the weapons he asked for. Additionally, he
cinnounced that the Federation of Arab Republics had de-
cided to manufacture everything they could (weapons) inside
the federation. He also confided that arms agreements were
7being drawn up in "certain Western countries."
It was also during this early part of May that the
activities and demands of "certain rightist elements"
came to light. This right wing element was composed of
former leaders of the country, including some members of
the original Revolutionary Command Council. Three of the
men were former aides of Nasser. This group advocated
immediate action on the current grave unprecedented situation.
7
"Egypt: Domestic Unrest", An Ncihar Arab Report
,
May 8, 19 72, Vol. 3, No. 19, pps 1,2.
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abrogation of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, expulsion of
the Soviet experts, and re-activation of the Jarring
g
mission. (The Jarring mission was the name of the committee
appointed by the UN Security Council to seek a peaceful
solution to the Middle East crisis after the 196 7 war. The
mission was headed by Gunnar Jarring who advocated talks
which included not only Egypt and Israel, the the US and
the USSR as well.) Sadat was visibly shaken by this sudden
emergence of the right wing element, especially since it
was made up of such respected and knowledgeable men. Sadat
even tried to assimilate the group into the ASU in order
to give it a legitimate voice in the leadership of the
country
.
Obviously the domestic unrest and the lack of faith and
trust in the national government had reached grave propor-
tions when such an extra-governmental faction as described
cibove could voice its criticisms publically and be heard.
Sadat knew he was in trouble, and his benefactor, the
Soviet Union, was not coming to his rescue.
The summer of 19 72 marked the beginning of the end of
Soviet influence in Egypt and perhaps even the Middle East.
On July 18, 19 72 President Sadat announced that he was
removing (asked Moscow to recall) 15,000 Soviet advisors
^Ibid.
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from Egypt. (The actual nmnber of advisors is not known;
original estimates range from 10,000 to 15,000.) The Soviet
military would stay as well as a number of civilian tech-
nicians who were engated in important industrial and
economic projects.
Sadat listed four reasons why he decided to take this
drastic action: 1) Failure by the Soviets to honor their
commitments in meeting Egyptian timetables for arms deliv-
eries; 2) Soviet procrastination in providing Egypt with
modern weapons; 3) the "atmosphere of suspicion" that con-
stantly characterized the relations between the two coun-
tries; 4) the rise of a new situation in the wake of the
United States-Soviet Union summit conference in Moscow in
May, 19 72.^
These are the reasons given by Sadat himself, and while
basically true, were not the only reasons. Political obser-
vers saw a more international consideration to the expulsion.
US News and World Report Middle East editors listed three
additional reasons for the ouster: 1) an open invitation
to the United States to change its Mideast policy and influence
the Israelis to adopt a more flexible position; 2) to
reduce the rising frustration inside Egypt: 3) to administer
a shock to Moscow and force it to reconsiider its refusal to
supply Egypt with offensive weapons
.
9
"Soviets to Continue to Get Facilities", The Arab
World Weekly, July 27, 1972, p. 1.
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The immediate Russian reaction to the expulsion of
its advisors was muted. The Soviets did not attack Egypt
for the decision, nor did they balk; Moscow began to remove
its personnel the next day.
Although Sadat's action constituted a major strategic
and political setback for the Kremlin in the Middle East,
Moscow still believed that its influence would prevail,
that its foothold was secure. After all, Egypt had just
recently signed a fifteen year friendship treaty, and Egypt
owed Russia a great deal of money, not to mention the fact
that Egypt was still dependent on Soviet resupply for its
military and on Soviet expertise for its hydro-electric
plants and many of its factories . Sadat had not broken
those ties. The Soviets correctly analyzed the Sadat move
as an admonishment to the Soviets over weapons and timetables.
The Soviets fully expected the deterioration of the alliance
to stop at that point. In fact, the Soviets admitted
that they actually benefitted by the Egyptian action.
First, the Russicin leaders were convinced that the
Egyptians were incapable of using sophisticated weapons
and would suffer cinother defeat like that of 1967 if the
Soviets delivered modem, offensive weapons to Egypt.
Secondly, the Russicins were determined above all to avoid
a US-USSR confrontation and this friction between Egypt
and the Soviet Union allowed for a lessening of the possi-
bility of a showdown in the Middle East with the United
States. In cinother Arab-Israeli war the Russians would
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have a real dilemma; either confront the United States
by actively aiding the Egyptians against Israel, or stand
passively by while their allies were defeated once again.
The official public statements by Moscow over the incident
all emphasized the fact that the withdrawal was mutually
agreed on by Moscow and Cairo, a statement that Cairo
never supported.
It became more and more obvious as the year drew to
a close that Sadat was intent on a complete break with
Moscow if the Soviets didn't deliver the arms the Egyptians
needed for the anticipated war with Israel. The Russians
remained steadfast; no new weapons. The Soviets also de-
creased the resupply of military hardware and parts for the
existing Egypticm forces. Sadat now faced a new crisis;
where to turn for military aid and resupply.
In the months that followed the Soviet expulsion, Sadat
tried to soothe over the deep rift in the Russian-Egyptian
relationship. It was as though Sadat immediately realized
that he may have cut his own throat in relation to his
avowed objective of avenging the 196 7 defeat and regaining
the Arab lands. Sadat went to great lengths in his speeches
to emphasize that the Soviet Union and the Egyptian Arab
Republic were still friends and that Egypt fully intended
to abide by the 19 71 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
The Russian military was allowed to remain in Egypt and
allowed to maintain bases, and the Russian Navy was still
permitted to make port calls for recreation and resupply.
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As if to make one last effort at restoring the former
relationship between the two countries, Sadat sent Prime
Minister Aziz Sidky to Moscow in October, 1972 to discuss
the turn of events with the Soviet leaders. There was
apparently cause for optimism upon Sidky 's return. Sidky
reported that there was no c-ange in the policy of the
Soviet Union toward Egypt. The joint communique that
followed the talks reaffirmed all of the articles of the
1971 Treaty of Friendship. Sidky reported that the "talks
have succeeded in melting the ice that affected our relation-
ship with the Soviet Union in this past period, and now
relations between us will proceed normally ..." (The
advisors did not return, however.)
After October Sadat's speeches once again turned toward
Israel cuid the inevitability of war. Preparations for this
unavoidable battle continued in earnest in Egypt, yet as
the year closed there were no new weapons from the Soviet
Union. The Egyptian military was as sceptical as ever.
It should be noted at this point that throughout 1972
(and the latter part of 1971) , Egypt stepped up its efforts
to deal with the West, specifically the United States. Sadat
had some limited success in negotiating arms sales with
Great Britain and France and apparently received some
assurances from the US that it (the US) would do all it
could to bring about a peaceful settlement in the Middle
East if Egypt took "more positive action" on its own. These
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factors must have played a significant part in Sadat's
decision to expel the Soviets. He would never have acted
unilaterally in this direction if he had no alternatives.
It is possible to measure Sadat's success with the West
by simply reading his speeches. Immediately after the
expulsion of the Soviet advisors Sadat's speeches were
appropriately anti-US, but left some room for optimism about
United States intervention and sincerity. One must remember
however, that the United States was at its most critical
period in the Vietnam war and the Middle East was not the
most pressing problem; a fact that Sadat may have minimized
or overlooked. This is supported by the change of attitude
by Sadat in the fall of 1972 when he obviously felt let down
by the West and the United States and began several bitter
attacks on the US. Obiously Sadat did not get the immediate
response he was hoping for when he expelled the Russians.
As noted above, Sadat — almost frantically — ran back to the
Russians to try to salvage the alliance in order to pursue
his and Egypt's objectives.
During the early months of 1973 Sadat tried to focus
national attention on domestic problems and domestic successes
This, he hoped, would direct attention away from Israel and
Russia and the failure of Sadat's foreign policy.
Sadat continued to send envoys to Moscow to try to
restore relations to their former high point. The atmosphere
in Moscow was congenial, the talks were lengthy, the communi-
ques issued at the conclusions of the meetings were favorable,
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but still there was no new military aid from the Soviet
Union. (It is interesting to note that at this same time,
the Soviets had dramatically increased their aid to the
Syrians in both economic and military aid. This was as if
to teach the Egyptians a lesson for the expulsion of the
advisors and shore up the Russians ' position in the Middle
East. Needless to say this infuriated Sadat and the
Egyptians and the increased amount of military hardware in
Syria made the Israelis very nervous.)
Sadat and his cabinet were quick to take advantage of
the Vietnam Paris Peace Accords of January 1973. As soon
as the US was out from under the tremendous burden presented
by the Vietnam crisis Sadat sent an envoy to carry on nego-
tiations with Washington to try to secure United States
intervention in the Middle East and possibly US aid for
Egypt. When national security advisor Hafez Ismail returned
from Washington, he brought no new news. The Americans seemed
as determined as ever to support Israel and protect Israel's
sovereignty. This point of view was anathema to the Arabs.
Yet, it must be emphasized that the door for negotiation and
understanding between Egypt and the United States was never
closed. The United States continued to insist that it (the
US) held the key to Middle East peace, and Egypt, now more
than ever, believed it.
As the year passed it became evident that the Soviets
agreed with the Americans on the necessity of a peaceful
solution to the Middle East crisis. The Soviets still
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refused to send any offensive weapons to Egypt and continued
to press Sadat for a peaceful, political solution to the
Arab-Israeli crisis. Sadat interpreted the United States
peaceful solution to mean allowing the Israelis to remain on
Arab lands occupied in the 196 7 war. Sadat bitterly attacked
the United States position in his May Day speech and urged
the Russians to abandon the idea of a peaceful solution.
Sadat saw no other way out of the crisis but war.
Despite these apparent setbacks, Sadat continued to send
envoys north to Moscow. In late May Foreign Minister Hassan
el-Zayyat visited the Kremlin for another round of talks.
The results were the same. Moscow left no doubt that a
peaceful solution was the only course they (the Russians)
would follow. The same tired rhetoric appeared in the state-
ments that followed the meetings. Sadat was convinced that
American-Soviet detente was more important to the Russians
than the short term successes of the Russian-Egyptian alliance.
In his speech in July on the anniversary of the Egyptian
Revolution Sadat criticized the Russians for allowing the
American-Soviet detente to stand in the way of full coopera-
tion between Russia and Egypt. He stated further that Egypt
was not happy with the weapons it was receiving from the
Soviet Union and also that Russian support for the Arcibs in
general was not adequate.
On August 4th the Middle East News Agency carried the text
of a "working paper" drafted to be used at the meeting of the
National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union in the quest for
107

a Mideast peace formula. Two of the more important
statements of the paper were that Egypt could no longer
afford to over-emphasize the importance of the Egyptian-
Russian alliance and instead must act in its own best
interest. The paper characterized the Russicins and the
Egyptians as growing farther and farther apart and even
suggested the possibility of the cancellation of the 1971
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The second important
point was that the Egyptians were actively seeking arms from
their Arab brothers since their pleas for new arms from
Russia fell on deaf ears. The Arab press had in fact reported
Libyan Mirages, Kuwaiti LighteningS/ cind Iraqi Hawker Hunters
arriving in Egypt. These developments clearly show that
Egypt was preparing herself for a possible break in Soviet-
Egyptian relations.
At 2PM on October 6, 1973 the fourth Arab-Israeli war
broke out. The causes of the war are almost too obvious.
The seeds of the 1973 war were undoubtedly sown in 1967. The
war immediately changed the political situation in the Middle
East as it brought an end to the Soviet encouraged state of
no-war, no-peace which followed the unsuccessful "war of
attrition." The fighting seemed to commence at the point
where the 1967 war had stopped, just as though both sides
"Egypt Reconsiders Its Middle East Policy" , The Arab
World Weekly, August 11, 1972, pps 5-10.
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had called a temporary cease-fire. Given the Middle East
deadlock that set in after the collapse of the US initiative
known as the "Rogers Plan", and the deadend reached by UN
mediator Gunnar Jarring, the outbrecik of hostilities was
inevitable, especially after the Egyptian bid to bring the
Middle East crisis to the United Nations failed.
As with the 1967 war the exact details of the fighting
are not importcint to this paper. The pertinent points are
basically these: the Arabs (Egyptians & Syrians) initiated
the fighting in the wake of large scale military movements
inside Israel. For the first four days the Arabs had the
upper hand, driving the Israelis back from the Suez Canal
and the Golan Heights. After 9 days of fighting the United
States began a massive resupply to Israel and the Soviet
Union countered with the threat of intervention. The United
States and the Soviet Union came to the dreaded "eyeball to
eyeball" confrontation over the Middle East war, and the
Soviet Union backed down. On October 20th, Secretary of
State Kissinger left for Moscow to insure the easing of
tension between the two superpowers and to discuss possible
courses of action for a ceasefire. On October 22 Egypt
accepted a ceasefire, Syria on October 23, and the fourth
Arab- Israeli war came to cin end.
For a full and excellent account of why Egypt opted
for full scale war, see: "General Ismail Speaks of the
October 6th War", The Arab World Weekly , November 24,
1973, pps 16-20.
109

For the purposes of this paper the results of the war
are best viewed from an Egyptian perspective, as this gives
an insight into Egypt's "mind-set" and provides a basis for
future relations with the international community, especially
the Soviet Union. The results, as Egypt saw them, are
clearly iterated by Lt. General Ahmed Ismail, War Minister
and Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces. The
following are General Ismail's remarks when asked about
the 19 73 war:
"1 — The myth aibout the Israeli soldier was
shattered before it could become firm in
people ' s minds . 2 — It was proven in front
of me that the Egyptian soldier is one of
the bravest and toughest in the world. His
patience and boldness are enough to testify
to that ... 3 — Any well plcinned action
supplemented by sufficient practical training
could be 100% successful. In addition to
these there are some strategic results which
I shall list as follows: A. We have broken
the ice which was about to engulf the Middle
East crisis. B. We have changed our image
in the whole world. The world, which thought
we were paralyzed, has now been convinced that
we are able to move, to fight, and to triumph.
This was not true of Egypt alone, but of the
entire Arab world as well. C. We have
proved to Israel that her logic about secure
borders was wrong. The Suez Canal was not
barrier enough in the face of a ferociously
determined will. The Bar Lev Line was not
a barrier enough in the face of full readiness
to sacrifice ..."-^^
12
"General Ismail Speciks of the October 6th War",
Loc. cit.
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From General Ismail's remarks it is clear that Egypt
felt that it, and the rest of the Arab world, won both a
real and a moral victory in the October war. The success
enjoyed by the Egyptians gave them a whole new perspective
on their importance and capabilities in the Middle East and
their status in the world. In speaking for Egypt General
Ismail told us that the 1973 war was planned and executed
"100%", and was done so without — indeed in spite of — the
Soviet Union or any other outside help. It was at this point
that we see Egypt begin to believe that she can stand alone,
that she is the master of her own fate. With the 1973
"victory" Sadat gained an enormous amount of power and
prestige, and was pushed out in the light away from Nasser's
shadow. Sadat now ruled from a position of power; his
domestic critics were silenced. More importcuit for this
paper, Sadat now negotiated from a position of strength. He
was no longer subservient to the Soviet Union, he was now an
equal.
For the first time since the mid 1950s Egypt heralded
the New Year with elated national spirit and optimism for
the future.
The role that the Soviets played in the war did nothing
to reaffirm or strengthen their alliance with Egypt. The
Soviets advised Sadat to seek a ceasefire within hours of
the outbreak of hostilities. This was completely in character
even though the Arabs were winning at that point. Sadat felt
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it was quite odd to have his ally tell him to stop his
offensive just when it appeared that he was succeeding.
The Soviets began a resupply effort to Egypt, but only
after the war effort had bogged down in the Sinai. By that
time the United States forces were already resupplying Israel
and the US forces were on alert. The USSR had to show some
effort to resupply and support her ally or be embarrassed
internationally
.
When the confrontation became grave, that is when the two
superpowers came face to face in the Mediterranean, they
realized they must back down. This cooling off, or de-
escalation was a relief to the United States and the Soviet
Union — and the rest of the .world — but was still unbelievable
to Egypt and the rest of the Arabs. Sadat and the other Arab
leaders knew that the Middle East war was not the American's
and the Soviet's war, but still this seeming obsession with
detente proved that the Russians would not support an ally in
a cause that would bring the superpowers face to face. Nor
would the Soviets supply an ally would lose in its military
endeavor and thereby embarras the Soviet Union.
There were no official remarks from Egypt about the
Soviet participation in the war until well into 1974. The
first statements about Soviet involvement in the October war
came when Sadat was interviewed by Alia al Solh , a Lebanese
journalist, in March of that year. Sadat's remarks further
indicated the deteriorating relations between Egypt and the
USSR. The President accused the Russians of stalling in
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delivering the weapons he had ordered prior to the 19 73 war.
During the interview Sadat confirmed that the Russian
ambassador asked him to contact Hafez Assad, President of
Syria, and seek a ceasefire six hours after the war started.
In the interview Sadat was very critical of the Soviet
assistance for Egypt (or lack of it) , the Russian policy of
no-peace, no-war, and the Soviet cooperation with the United
States despite the military support the US rendered to Israel.
In remarks made to the People • s Council and the ASU
Central Committee (April 1974) Sadat was more specific in
his criticism: "The Soviet Union has not replied to Egypt's
requests for arms submitted six months ago... This is why I
would like you to know in light of this situation, I have
reached a decision with our armed forces that we must
diversify the sources of our armaments. The decision has
been implemented. Being responsible for our people and
nation, I cannot stand with my arms tied up for six months
and leave our forces without protection."
Sadat also made it clear that Egypt had not intended to
make friends with the United States at the expense of the
Soviet Union; however, as far as the United States was
concerned, there was undoubtedly a change in favor of the
Arabs. There was no amswer or reply from the Soviets.
(With these last two points in mind it is important to
note that Egypt resumed full diplomatic relations with the
13 The Arab World Weekly, April 20, 1974, p. 4
113

United States in November, 19 73. Additionally, Egypt was
successful in obtaining a limited number of aircraft from
France ( (Mirages) ) in November 19 73 and from Saudi Arabia
in January, 1974.)
There was an icy silence between Moscow and Cairo for
the first three quarters of 1974, However, President Nixon
visited Cairo in June and shortly thereafter significant
economic and investment agreements were renewed between
Egypt and the United States . The accords included a promise
by the United States to provide Egypt with nuclear reactors
(a promise the Russians had made but not kept) , and a promise
of aid for Egypt in the amount of $250 million. Egypt agreed
to allow four major US bsoiks to operate in the country. Once
again it seemed that the flag would follow trade.
Egypt seemed to be turning to the US economically as well
as politically and this trend further deepened the anxiety of
the Soviets over the Egyptian situation.
This movement towards the United States was encouraged
and welcomed by the Saudis. The Soviets had always been at
odds with the Saudis (primarily over religion) aind with the
strained relations between Egypt and the USSR Ccone a
strengthening of relations between the Egyptians and the
anti-Soviet governments in the Middle East.
The undoing of Soviet-Egyptian relations was not welcomed
by Sadat. Sadat, displeased as he was with Soviet inaction,
was desperate for Soviet aid. Egypt needed arms and military
supplies. Egypt had not established any new pipeline of
114

armaments and all of Egypt's Russian weapons were in need
of spare parts. Even if Egypt could have switched suppliers
instantly, it would have taken (and still will) years for the
complete cheuigeover and retraining. Sadat continued to
emphasize that while there were differences between the two
countries, he would like to see better relations re-established
between the governments. For their part the Soviets continued
to follow their own advice that Sadat could not import weapons
from Moscow and policy from Washington. Observers believed
that at this time the Kremlin had written off the Sadat regime,
but not Egypt. The Soviets seemed to be content to wait in
wings until Sadat was gone and then approach the new Egyptian
administration. In the meanwhile the Russians decided to
fully support Syria in order to back up their decision in
Egypt; they needed a client in the Middle East in order to
maintain their physical presence and influential base.
By August 1974 Egypt was in urgent need of spare parts
and repair for its weapons. Sadat stated in an interview
published in As-Sayyad in mid August that he had not received
any arms deliveries from the Soviets in the past nine months.
Egyptian officials, including Sadat, had visited the Eastern
European countries to try to obtain some armaments and to
try to persuade the Bulgarian and Rumanian leaders to inter-
vene in Moscow on behalf of Egypt to persuade the Kremlin to
resume its arms shipments to Egypt. Other Soviet Union arms
recipients — Yugoslavia, Rumania, Algeria, and India — were
studied as possible sources of Egyptian resupply. All of
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this effort was to no avail. It became clear to Sadat that
the farther apart Egypt and Russia grew, the more he needed
US friendship and aid — not just as an arms supplier and
economic benefactor, but as an international power with the
ability to prevent Israel from launching an attack against
Egypt or the other Arab states. With no armed force as a
deterrent, Sadat needed the United States to maintain the.
peace in the Middle East.
A glimmer of hope for better relations between the Soviet
Union and Egypt appeared in September 19 74. Russia re-
extended an earlier invitation to Foreign Minister Fahmi to
visit Moscow to discuss relations between the two countries.
At the outset the talks seemed to be fruitful. It was
agreed that Secretary Brezhnev would pay a state visit to
Egypt in January 1975. The Soviets* waiting game seemed to
pay dividends. With the resignation of President Nixon in
August and the slow action on the part of the United States
Congress in approving the $250 million in aid and the nuclear
reactors, the stage was set for the Soviets to move back into
Egypt. The possibility of Soviet advisors in Egypt was
discussed at the talks between Fahmi and Brezhnev. Once
again it seemed that the possibility of close United States-
Egyptian ties was thwarted by US domestic issues and politics
and once again the Soviets could take advantage of the vacuum.
With these developments, the Soviets were expected to fill
Egypt's arms orders as well as rendering the economic aid and
nuclear reactors that Egypt needed.
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Even though progress with respect to relations with the
United States appeared stalled, Sadat still wanted balanced
relations with the two superpowers , This was made clear to
all parties and obviously displeased the Kremlin. 19 74 ended
with Sadat no closer to a solution to his problems. The
Russians had not delivered any arms and he (Sadat) was still
very distant — diplomatically — from both the United States
and the Soviet Union.
The high hopes that Sadat held for Russian-Egyptian
relations in 19 75 vanished early in the year when Brezhnev
cancelled his scheduled visit to Cairo. For a chief of
state to cancel a visit to another nation is a major event —
even an affront, and that was especially true in this case
as the trip had been scheduled three months earlier and was
to have been Brezhnev's first visit to Egypt. The Brezhnev
visit was to clear the air between Moscow and Cairo, now it
was more cloudy than ever. The official reason for the
Ccincellation was given as Brezhnev's poor health, but even if
this was the sole reason (auid there is some doubt as Brezhnev
had made other trips abroad) it could not have come at a
worse time for Soviet-Egyptian relations.
With the postponement of the Brezhnev visit came the
lowest point in the entire span of Soviet-Egyptisui cooperation.
The Soviet Union was not going to interfere with US Secretary
Kissinger's peace efforts in the Middle East, and with the
strengthening of detente between the US and the USSR, it was
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evident that the Soviets were willing to let the United
States try its hand at peace making in the Middle East.
At the end of January 1975 Sadat concluded an arms agree-
ment with France which would bring at least 44 French Mirage
F-1 fighter-bombers to Egypt. Sadat was definitely diversi-
fying his arms sources and preparing for a possible complete
shut-off of all Soviet supplies. The agreement was also
designed to put pressure on the Soviet Union to resume arms
shipments. Sadat seemed to have succeeded in that early in
February Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed in principle to
resume arms shipments, but specific dates and details were
not discussed. (By this time Egypt had already concluded
agreements with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates to provide arms to Egypt through a re-transfer
process
.
)
Even though Western weapons were on their way to Egypt,
Sadat and the Egyptian military were still desperate. For
the immediate future, there was no alternative to Soviet
weapons and supplies. The Egyptian forces had been using
Soviet weapons for 20 years and estimates from military
experts said that Egypt would need 10 years to completely
switch from Soviet weapons and technology to Western weapons..
Sadat's own estimates exceeded 5 years for the changeover.
Although Sadat and the military desperately needed Soviet
arms, they just as desperately wanted to keep Soviet techni-
cians and advisors out of Egypt. In the early months of 19 75
the Soviets indicated that they would send weapons if they
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could also send technicians auid advisors. These conditions
were unacceptable to Sadat — and to the military. This
shared dislike of the Soviet advisors explains why Sadat v/as
not under more pressure from the military to obtain Soviet
arms and supplies at any cost; apparently the Egyptian
military leaders wanted Soviet interference even less than
Sadat
.
On May 16, 1975, Beirut's weekly magazine, Al Hawadeth
,
published an interview with Sadat in which he clarified the
Egyptian-Soviet differences. Sadat stated that the differ-
ences revolved around two points , economics and arms . Sadat
said that he could not continue paying the Soviets in 1975
at the same rate he paid in 19 74 and yet the Soviets would
not relent. He also stated that the Soviets would not replace
Egyptian weapons. Just as it had been the beginning of the
Soviet-Egyptian alliance, this issue of weapons was also to
be the undoing.
By mid 1975 Sadat was quite clear and vocal about wanting
to deal with the United States to obtain aid and to effect a
Middle East peace settlement. This iced the relationship
even more. It was obvious that Sadat was very pleased with
the United States, specifically President Ford, and very
displeased with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet-Egyptian alliance was on a downhill slide and
by August 1975 was clearly doomed. Egyptian forces were
training in Western weapon systems and Sadat's attacks on
the Soviet Union became more frequent and more caustic. In
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September Sadat stated, "When the day comes for revealing
the documents exchanged between us and the Russians, you will
know that no man's pride would tolerate the Soviet way of
dealing.
"
When 1975 drew to a close, the Soviets had still not sent
any weapons to Egypt; they had instead supported Syria to
the fullest ever since the 1973 war, and had by December,
1975 even begun to supply arms to Libya. The Soviets seemed
to be saying to Sadat, "You can't treat us the way you did
in 1972 and accuse us of dirty dealings and expect us to
support you. We will support your Arab brothers to maintain
our influence in the Middle East and at the same time teach
you a lesson."
In 1976 Egypt began to negotiate with Britain and Italy
for modification of hundreds of Soviet supplied tanks so that
they could use Western parts and ammunition. In February the
Soviets cinnounced that they would no longer overhaul the
MIG-21 engine for the Egyptians. This development threatened
to ground most of the Egyptian Air Force. Moscow had contin-
ued to send absolutely necessary spare parts to Egypt to keep
the MIGs airborne; now even that trickle of spare parts was
terminated.
This was the last straw for Sadat. On March 15, 19 76
Sadat announced the unilateral abrogation of the Egyptian-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 19 71. Sadat
14
"Sadat on The Soviets", Arab World Weekly , September 13,
1975, p. 18.
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accused the Russians of putting a vici9us economic and
military squeeze on him and of defacto abrogating the Treaty
themselves months before. There was now very little left
of the Soviet-Egypticui alliance.
On March 27, 1976 Sadat formally asked the United States
for arms. He requested fighter planes, anti-tank missiles,
and other defensive weapons systems. Sadat stated that
Soviet actions cuid policy had put him in an untenable
situation. At the same time that Sadat spoke a United
States guided missile destroyer the USS Dahlgreen, made a
port call on Alexandria. This was a very symbolic gesture
on the part of the Egyptians, as the Soviet Union had been
the only major power allowed in Egyptian ports in 20 years.
On April 4, 1976 Sadat announced that he was closing
Egyptian ports to Soviet ships. The Russians would have to
be out by April 14th. This was Sadat's final measure of
reprisal for the military and economic pressure levied by
the Soviets
.
By April 15, 1976 the Soviet-Egyptian alliance was over.
The only connections left between the two countries were
their respective diplomatic missions. The alliances had not
gone the way either side had intended, and both sides had
lost.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Lessons Learned
This chapter will review Russiain involvement in Egypt
with respect to the following points : how did the Soviet
Union gain a position of influence in Egypt; why did the
Soviets wish to commit themselves so deeply to Nasser and
Sadat; why did Egypt seek Soviet aid; how did the Kremlin
manage to lose its position of prestige and influence in
Egypt; why was the West denied access to Egypt and the Middle
East; and finally, what are the developing relationships now '
(1976) between Egypt and the Superpowers.
Finally, this paper will examine the lessons learned
from Russia's Egyptian "experiment". There are some valuable
insights to be gained by and from all of the participants in
this phase of Egyptian history.
We will look, at some general conditions for, and objectives
of, alliances, and look closely at errors committed by Egypt
and the Soviet Union in their dealing with one another.
Further, we will look at costly errors made by the United
States and the West that precluded a Western influential
presence in the Middle East.
In conclusion this chapter will present some recommenda-
tions or prescriptions, for foreign policy making in general,
and Middle East policy making in particular, in light of the
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Russian experience in Egypt. The United States cannot afford
to make the same mistakes that it made in 19 54-55 with regards
to Egypt and the Middle East. The time is right — right now —
for positive action on the part of the United States in the
Mideast.
Let us first review Russia's entry into the Middle East
and Egypt. Historically, Russian presence in the Middle
East dates back to the year lOOOAD. This presence was
primarily commercial. Russicui traders conducted business
in and around Constantinople and the Caspian Sea. This type
of presence was quite natural; all countries — even adven-
turous companies and private citizens — have always expanded
their commercial horizons whenever they had the means to do
so. Trade and commerce are the common denominators that
brought nations and continents closer together. This expan-
sion of trade and exploration of new trade routes is a natural
human or political phenomenon and Russia's desires in these
directions were no different th2Ln those of any other European
power up to and including the 18th century. In short, Russia
had as much right to be in the Near East as any other nation.
Russicin goals in the Middle East changed from purely
economic goals to military-political-economic goals during
the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) . Peter realized
that if Russia was to be a great European and world power
she must have free access to open water for military and
commercial fleets. This was the inception of the Russian
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obsession for warm water ports. This overwhelming desire
for warm water ports continued as a dominant theme of Russian
foreign policy from Peter the Great through Catherine the
Great and Nicholas II (1682-1917)
.
With the Russian revolution came a decreased interest
in world affairs and in the Middle East. The new Bolshevik
leaders struggled for years after the revolution to consolidate
their power base and cure the numerous domestic ills of the
country. The Russians were not concerned about foreign trade
or a far-flung military force until the advent of World War II.
Even though the USSR had normal, everyday contacts with
her neighbors to the south — Turkey and Iran — prior to World
War II, and although she (Russia) sponsored Communist parties
in several Middle Eastern countries and aligned herself
ideologically with the toiling masses of the colonized
peoples, it was not until the Soviet Union began to compete
with the United States and the NATO countries in the 1950s
that any real Russian interest was manifested in the Middle
East.
The Soviet Union was (and still is) actually paranoid
about the West's and NATO's success in encircling the Soviet
Union with military bases and allies. They were virtually
forced — faced with their objectives of self defense and
Communist domination of the world — to expand their foreign
policy horizons and actively compete with the West for client
states and allies. One need but look at a map of Europe and
Asia to see that the USSR was reasonably secure on all of
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her borders except to the south. The most vulnerable area
to the Soviet Union was her southern flank — the Middle East.
This was precisely the area where the United States and the
West were making strategic gains with NATO and the Baghdad
Pact. The USSR had to msd^e inroads into this link of
containment to the south or face possible future disastrous
consequences. (Not to mention the valuable natural resources
and propaganda value that the Middle East held.) It seems
obvious now that the Russicins must have had then — between
1950 and 1955 — an overwhelming desire to gain influence in
the Middle East. She anxiously awaited an opportunity to
move. Egypt provided just such an opportunity in 1955.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Soviet Union did
not "target" Egypt. The opportunity to move into Egypt is
better classified as an historical accident. Through a
process of elimination or deduction, one can see that Russia
had little chance of gaining a dominant position of influence
in any Mideast country. Constant border clashes and diplomatic
entanglements kept the Soviets out of Turkey and Iran;
ideology and historical precedent kept the Russians from
gaining any real influence in Israel, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and even Egypt. It is
humorous, in an ironic sense, that this list is a list of all
the countries in the Middle East. The Soviet Union's foreign
policy objective of jumping over containment and securing
client states to the south must have seemed virtually
unobtainable to Russian policy makers and diplomats in the
early 1950s.
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After the Free Officers succeeded in their July 1952
revolution in Egypt they found themselves without the
resources to build and maintain a sovereign, visible nation-
state. Egypt's new leaders sought aid immediately. They
correctly reasoned that an independent, sovereign nation
must be economically sound, and possess a military force
capcdDle of defending the country, and a government which is
strong, stable, and reasonably acceptable to the other
nations of the world.
Egypt's new government needed recognition from the other
governments of the world; it needed economic aid from and
trade with the industrial nations ; and certainly it needed
military aid in the form of weapons in order to shore up a
badly equipped, poorly trained armed force. In retrospect,
these were legitimate needs of the new Egyptian government,
yet when Egypt sought this kind of recognition and aid from
the industrial nations (principally Britain, France, and the
United States) the West turned a deaf ear.
The governments of the West were either too short-sighted,
selfish (because of their own goals) , or too pre-occupied
with the Soviet Union to judge Egypt's needs and requests
objectively. Certainly there was cause for concern that
Nasser's government might not be stable, that Nasser might
in fact be a passing military dictator, or that grant-aid
might be squandered or misused, but no thorough evaluation
or objective analysis of the new Egyptian governm.ent or its
goals was made. Instead, personality and personal opinion
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led the leaders of the United States, Britain, and France
to tuim down Egypt's requests for economic aid, technical
assistance, and weapons. The situation became grave for
Egypt's government and Nasser had no choice but "to look
elsewhere" for support. At that time (indeed, even now) the
only other possible source of aid was the Soviet Union.
Nasser asked the Soviet Union for arms through Chou En-lai
in 1955. The Soviets were ready to deal. They knew that a
major arms deal would create a certain dependency on the
Kremlin and this was precisely the opening the Soviets had
hoped for in the Middle East. After the critical arms deal
of 1955 the Soviet presence in Egypt grew by quantum leaps
every year.
The Egyptian government had asked the World Bank, the
United States and Britain to finance the construction of
the High Aswan Dam, and for reasons explained earlier in the
paper, the West turned Nasser down. This was the final
costly mistake by the West. Nasser nationalized the Suez
Canal in an attempt "to show the world" he could raise the
revenue himself for the Aswan Daun. This action precipitated
the Suez Crisis which brought the world to the brink of war.
Britain, France, and Israel engaged in military operations
against Egypt; the U.S. condemned Nasser and Egypt and brought
the issue to the United Nations. Obviously, this crisis
finished the West as far as Nasser was concerned. The Soviet
Union on the other hand was a new found friend and ally of
Egypt.
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In 19 58 the Soviet Union agreed to finance the Aswan
Dciin cind provide technical assistance. This agreement was
the first of a long series of agreements on construction,
urban improvement, trade, and cultural exchanges. With the
economic and military aid came an ever increasing number of
advisors and technicians, both military and civilian.
The Russian-Egyptian allicince continued to grow and
mature until 1967. The June 1967 war marked a crisis for the
alliance. Nasser was sure that the Russians would "back him
to the hilt" in his confrontation with Israel. Yet in the
months prior to the war the Kremlin urged Nasser to seek a
diplomatic solution to the Middle East crisis. Further, the
Soviets asked Nasser not to fire the first shot in a war with
Israel. Nasser began to wonder if Russia was his true ally.
When the war finally came Russian support for Egypt was moral,
not physical. The Russians assured Nasser there would be no
American intervention; they condemned Israel; they supported
Egypt in the United Nations. This support fell far short of
what Nasser expected. It was not until after the ceasefire
that Moscow responded to Egypt's needs.
When Nasser emerged as a hero and popular leader instead
of a loser and a target for Arab ire, the Russians immediately
sided with him. Past experience told the Russians they could
not lose while backing a popular leader of the masses. A few
days after the ceasefire the Russians began to replace Egypt's
war losses. They also increased the total amount of aid and
the number of advisors in accordance with Nasser's requests.
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This sudden renewed support for Egypt seemed to make up for
the non-support during the war, and the Russian-Egyptian
alliance emerged from the 1967 war stronger than ever.
The relationship continued on a steady course even through
Nasser's death in 1970, until it reached a peak in 1971 with
the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The
alliance begsm a steady downhill slide from that point on.
It is clear now that the Russians and the Egyptians did
not agree on what kind of support was best for Egypt.
Russia continued to supply training, necessary military
supplies, advisors, and technicians, but Egypt wanted
offensive military hardware. The Soviets refused. The
Soviets again urged a diplomatic settlement to the Mideast
crisis. The Soviets diplomatically argued that Egypt needed
good advice, good planning and tactics, continued industrial
expansion, and a well-commanded, well-trained army. While
the Soviets were objectively correct, Egypt (Sadat) declared
that this was not enough. Egypt wanted modern, offensive
weapons. The Soviets never specifically refused the request,
but they never delivered.
Convinced that he needed weapons and not advice, and in
an attempt to show the Kremlin that he was the real power in
Egypt, Sadat expelled the Soviet advisors in 19 72.
The Russian reaction to, and support for, Egypt during
the 19 73 war was much the same as for the 19 6 7 war. They
advised Sadat against it; they urged him to call off the war
a few hours after it began. In Sadat's mind this was not the
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help and advice of a friend and ally. At the conclusion of
hostilities the Soviets were unwilling to replace Egyptian
losses. They also failed to deliver the weapons that Sadat
ordered before the war.
The alliance was doomed. Egypt continued to request
weapons, and eventually asked for only parts and resupply,
but there was no support from the Russians. Sadat was forced
to seek help from other sources. The continued rejections
by the Soviet Union were so infuriating and embarrassing to
Sadat that ultimately in 1976 he unilaterally abrogated the
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Shortly thereafter
he closed Egyptian ports to Russian vessels. All that
remained of the once formidable alliance was normal, formal
diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Ironically, it was the arms issue that brought Russia
into Egypt and also forced her out. It is also ironic that
in many respects the same situation exists today (19 76) that
existed in 19 54 in Egypt. The Egyptian government is in need
of economic aid, faces a grave Arab-Israeli situation, has a
weakened military, and perceives its most immediate need to
be a weapons supplier. However, now the roles are reversed.
The Soviet Union has turned a deaf ear to Cairo and Sadat has
sought aid from the United States and the West.
While it was passive refusal to support Egypt in both the
1967 and 1973 wars and active refusal to deliver modem
offensive weapons systems to Egypt that proved to be the
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undoing of the alliance, there were other factors that eroded
the basis of the alliance.
Early on in the relationship the Soviets gave some
disastrous advice to the Egyptians. They urged Nasser to
support the revolutionaries in Yemen. Yemen became Nasser's
Viet Ncim. The Yemen involvement cost Egypt billions and
drained the strength of the Egyptian armed forces. Many
analysts agree that Egypt entered the 1967 war with Israel
with a defeated army; it was already exhausted from its five
year war in Yemen. The Soviets did not accept any of the
responsibility for the failure in Yemen; they simply asserted
that the Egyptisin army couldn't handle the job.
Some Arab writers relate that Egypt had a tactically sound
plan to strike first at Israel on the eve of the 19 6 7 war.
When the plan was related to the Russian advisors, they
rejected it as impossible, doomed to failure. Nasser always
felt that had he struck first, the outcome of the 1967 war
would have been dramatically different.
Still another factor that detracted from the Soviet-
Egyptian relationship was the type and quality of the
industrial and economic aid the Russians supplied Egypt.
At the height of the alliance there were more than 87 factories
or industrial complexes set up by the Soviets in order to aid
in Egypt's industrialization. In fact, very few of these
complexes were ever operational. Many were only on paper.
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others were no more than foundations, and still other lacked
the necessary machinery to make them operational.
As the number of Russiam advisors and technicians grew
in Egypt, their presence became more and more a source of
contention among the population. The Russians kept to them-
selves and limited contacts with the Egyptians to official
business. Socializing was only present at the highest levels.
(Some of this segregation was imposed by the Egyptian govern-
ment, but the result was the same.) The Russians even lived
in separate communities in and around Cairo and Alexandria.
Russian officers had command and control over Egypticin forces,
but no Egyptian commanded or supervised any Russian military
or civilian advisor. Eventually Russian officers actually
had veto power over Egyptian operations and plans. By 19 72
Russian air controllers had complete authority over Egypt's
entire air defense network. They virtually commsinded all of
Egypt's air operations. Ultimately, only Russian pilots
flew intercept missions and only Russian operators could
launch and control the SAM missiles.
This situation obviously made a negative impression on
not only the Egyptian military, but also on the private
citizen. By 1972 the Egyptians saw the Russians as another
This information was gleaned from informal interviews
with Egyptians who lived in Egypt during the period in question
These individuals are highly educated and had access to
reliable news sources and government officials. The author has
no reason to doubt the substamce of the comments made by these
Egypticin citizens.
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colonialist power. They began to wonder if there was any
difference between the Russian occupation of the Eastern
European countries and the Russiem presence in the Middle
East. It seemed that the Kremlin wanted to control the
Middle East. Before his death even Nasser wondered if he
had traded British colonialism for Soviet colonialism.
Perhaps the feeling of the Egyptians and of Sadat himself
about the Russians are best explained by several of the
remarks Sadat made in 19 75 about the Soviet-Egyptian relation-
ship. The following excerpts are from Sadat's speech of
September 28, 1975 which marked the fifth anniversary of
Gamal Nasser's death.
"When I accepted the ceasefire on October
22, 1973 — and I want our brothers in the Syrian
Baath Party to hear this — I was facing both the
Americans and the Jews. America with its strength
and its new weapons that had never before left the
United States. They brought the weapons and
(American) experts entered the battle in the days
of the break through (the west bank of the Suez
Canal) . . . Just as America and Israel were in front
of me, the Soviet Union was on my back... The air
bridge which brought in weapons was bringing
weapons that should have been delivered in 1969.
These weapons had been requested by Nasser, but
the Russians did not deliver them because they
wanted to punish Nasser as he had refused to stop
the war of attrition at their request. . . The
Soviet Union was on my back and I was afraid of
the Soviet Union just as I was afraid of the
Americans and Israelis... The Russians flooded
Syria with weapons following my decision to expel
Soviet advisors in 1972. The Russians began to
spoil Syria... History repeats itself. The Soviet
Union has had the habit of hitting one Arab regime
with another. They begcin to hit Egypt with Syria
when Nasser was alive, and they used to tease him
that it would be Syria that would liberate Arab
land. They are doing this again now. They wcint
to hit Egypt with Syria again. Salah Jadid with
Nasser and now Hafez Assad with Sadat... 14 months
after the war ended the Soviet Union has not sent
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me a single straw. As for Syria, which lost
all of its tanks and most of its airplanes in
the war, the Soviet Union replaced them before
the ceasefire took effect."
President Sadat leveled an even more scathing indictment
at the Soviet Union in sin interview with the Kuwaiti news-
paper Al Siyassa on September 9, 1975.
"I think I will have to m.ake a review of a
few things here. In 1972 I was the only ally to
the Soviet Union here in Egypt, cind I said that
at a meeting of the Central Committee. I also
went to the People's Council and talked to all
the Egyptian officials , and they were present at
the People's Council meeting. I told them he who
is ready to cooperate with me in cooperating with
the Soviets is welcome to do so. He who is not
should quit. This is despite the fact that the
Soviets had let me down in the decisive year of
1971 when they refused to provide me with weapons.
"I took this stand because I wanted to reach a
solution with the Soviets. Before Nasser's death
and after I took over, I have spent 10 years
dealing with the Russians. The decision to withdraw
(expel) the Soviet advisors has a long story which I
will write some day in my memoirs, and the people
of the Arab homeland will know then why I asked for
their withdrawal.
"We fought with Soviet weapons but, in my view,
it is those who used the weapons , and not the weapons
themselves that won the war. For I was ten steps
behind Israel and three steps behind Syria. After
the withdrawal of the Soviet advisors from Egypt,
large quantities of technologically advanced weapons
arrived in Syria. But I did not get any weapons
except in the summer of 19 73 and that is a whole
year after Syria got them.
"One day I will explain how the Israelis were
10 steps ahead of me in the technology of weapons
cind the Syrians were three steps ahead of me. I
visited Russia four times. They let us down in the
year of decision. And yet I continued to defend
them inside Eqypt. If they want Egypt to be ruled
by the centers of power, this is rejected, because
in my domestic affairs I am not prepared to accept
the guardianship of anybody.
"There is a secret which I Wcint to disclose
here. Ever since I became President, the Russians
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have not been satisfied. They wanted somebody
else to be President. .
.
"I am not angry because the Soviets delay
in providing us with new weapons or delay
rescheduling our debts. They refuse to provide
us with new weapons. They refuse to replace our
losses (in the 1973 war) . The refuse to implement
old contracts which had been concluded between us
and them. It was only 14 months after the
ceasefire — it was January and Brezhnev's visit
was being cancelled — that they notified us that
they will send some of the weapons covered by old
contracts and which should have been delivered in
1973 and 1974. They sent some weapons and then
withheld the rest. In other words, they implemented
only parts of the contracts and not all of them.
"When will Brezhnev visit Egypt? We don't know
and they won't say. What is the state of our
relations? They don't reply. The rescheduling of
our debts? They don't reply. The Soviets were
told that Sadat would cancel the treaty on July 23
and so, on July 20, they invited the Finance
Minister (Egyptian) for negotiations. But I sent
the Finance Minister after I had delivered my speech
on July 23, and naturally I did not cancel the
agreement, because the matter was out of the question.
"The result was that the Finance Minister went
to Moscow and came back empty handed. They promised
us they would send a committee to negotiate and until
now the committee had not arrived. And until now we
don't know when Brezhnev will visit Egypt or the
nature of our military cind economic relations...
"VThen the day comes for revealing the documents
exchanged between us and the Soviets, you will know
that no main's pride would tolerate the Soviet way of
dealing. . . Even Nasser himself had declared that he
was fed up with this method of dealing with the
Russians... You send them an urgent request, perhaps
a request related to your very destiny. But they
don't answer. They would tell you that the Soviet
leaders are in the Crimea where they usually spend
four months from May to October. Naturally you will
have to wait until the leaders return to Moscow, and
then they will need a month and a half for rest in
Moscow and then they may answer you. As to Americans,
until now not a single request have I made but I got
a reply, either positive or negative in 48 hours.
They make life easier for me when they reply,
regardless of whether the reply is negative or positive
But the Russians would sometimes allow six months to
pass without replying, and this is in spite of the fact
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that there are certain things which they had
pledged. This is the difference between the
Russians and the Americans.
"But what I want every Arab to know is that
we should keep out of the game of the major
powers, detente or its opposite. We have our
own cause and we should keep away from the major
powers and their political game. What we should
do is to keep balanced relations with both and
maintain the freedom and independence of our
decision. My battle with the Soviets is that I
am trying hard to be independent and free in
making my decisions..."
The Russians did not succeed in Egypt because their goals
and objectives were not the same as those of Egypt. The
Soviets moved too quickly and did not realize that they
appeared to be "colonialists" the the Egyptians. The Soviets
became too involved in Egyptian internal affairs and began
to m.ake decisions for the Egyptians instead of simply
rendering advice when asked for it. Basically the Soviets
underestimated Sadat and failed to understand the Arabs
'
obsession for total independence and equality .
The Lessons ;
Virtually all nations and students of international rela-
tions can learn valuable lessons from the Russian-Egyptian
relationship. The United States, Russia, Egypt, and the
Arab nations all stand to learn the most from Russia's
experience in Egypt.
The United States has seen that foreign policy decisions
should not be made by a single individual. There is an entire
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bureaucracy estadDlished (actually more than one) to study,
evaluate, and analyze foreign policy issues and then formulate
policies or recommendations. In the case of the decisions
made by President Eisenhower — and even Dulles — there were
a number of options proposed by career, knowledgeable
diplomats that were not implemented. Instead the personal
preferences of Dulles and Eisenhower, influenced by European
heads of state, were manifested in the Middle East.
Additionally, United States domestic politics caused
the Congress to act in a negative manner towards Egypt at
a most critical time. Had President Eisenhower granted just
a few of the weapons requested by Egypt, had Dulles been more
sympathetic with Egypt's national objectives — divorced from
US vs. USSR considerations — or had the US Congress voted
the funds for the Aswan Dam, the United States would have
had an influential position in Egypt, and consequently the
Middle East, and would have been a factor in the now strategic
and critical Mideast. US diplomats and politicians, and even
Presidents, were too short sighted to see the possible long
range, beneficial consequences of a more positive attitude
toward Nasser, Egypt, and the Middle East.
The Soviet Union was ready and willing to respond to
Nasser and Egypt, but for the wrong reasons. Had Soviet
analysts looked more closely, they would have realized that
Egypt, indeed most of the Middle East, did not wish to be
part of the East-West confrontation game. Nasser wanted to
be his own man. Egypt would never have joined the Baghdad
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Pact, or NATO, or any other Western alliance. Nor was she
willing to join an Eastern alliance. The Soviets were still
laboring under the delusion that Moscow directed Communism
was the panacea for all peoples. They did not stop to consider
that the basis for the Arab Middle East government system.s —
Islam — was directly opposed to Communist philosophy and
ideology.
The Soviets should have moved much more slowly and cau-
tiously in Egypt, lest they be branded as exporters of
Communist doctrine or colonialists from another part of the
world. The Soviets should also have been less of a "big
brother" to Egypt and more of an uninvolved supplier if they
wanted to maintain their presence in Egypt. In other words,
once they assumed the role of wholesaler of weapons and
technology to Egypt they should have continued and filled
all of Egypt's orders with no questions asked. If they felt
that at some point that this v;ould be too costly for them in
light of the international situation (detente, etc.) then a
summit level meeting was called for to inform the Egyptians
that the arms supplies would be cut off. Their manner of
dealing with the Egyptians, that is passive refusal of
requests and icy silence, was unacceptable to the Egyptians.
Surely this method of dealing would garner the same results
if tried on any country in the future.
Egypt should have realized early on in her relationship
with the Soviet Union that she was going to import philosophy
and doctrine and even tactics along with the weapons and
138

technical assistance. Even if she had dealt with the West
the same would hold true. Weapons are all designed for a
specific use within a specific context. Industrial technology
and scientific achievement grow out of a specific national
philsophy or ideology. When Egypt imported weapons and
technology and advice from the Soviet Union, there necessarily,
de facto, followed a certain philosophy on how to use the
weapons, technology, and advice. This detrimental — from the
Egyptian point of view — aspect was magnified because the
Soviet Union was the sole supplier for Egypt for so many
years. When there is more than one supplier involved the
accompanying philosophy and advice is tempered. The receiver
nation is able to see the two or more philosophies or systems
side by side and either accept one, assimilate all, or reject
all with more objectivity.
Egypt, as many advisors to Nasser and Sadat urged, should
have made more of an effort to become independent of foreign
sources of weapons. Even today Sadat admits that he and
Egypt must rely on foreign sources of weapons and technology.
The decision to industrialize fully and appropriate the
necessary funds for building, developing resources, and
raising the educational level is a difficult decision to make
in light of the easier, faster solution of simply buying what
you need from a foreign power.
Egypt expected to achieve full independence because of
her alliance with the Soviet Union and instead grew more and
more dependent. The same phenomenon will occur if she now
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chooses to follow the same path and purchase all of her
military and industrial supplies from another "sole supplier".
The same lessons that Egypt learned from her experience
with Russia applies to the other Middle East countries. The
Soviet Union is in the Middle East for selfish reasons; it
cannot be any other way. No country can afford to expend the
amount of time and money that the Soviet Union has in the
Middle East without expecting to realize a tremendous return
on the investment. If the other Middle East countries who
are currently clients of the Soviet Union (Syria, Iraq,
Libya) continue a sole supplier relationship with Russia,
then they can expect much the same results that Egypt experi-
enced. The Middle East Countries — in fact, all developing
nations — must make the hard decision to place domestic
industrial, economic, and educational goals first if they
wish to achieve real freedom and independence. Since this
process of industrialization and emergence into the "first
world" — economically — is a slow one, these nations must
have benefactors or suppliers. However they must diversify
their sources of aid aind resources or face the possibility
of rejection or complete cutoff by the supplier just as
Egypt did.
Perhaps the real problem between Egypt and Russia was that
each perceived different objectives for the relationship and
yet both perceived the relationship as ain alliance. Their
relationship was, in fact, not an alliance. The relationship
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was one of patron and client, not ally and ally. The classic
factors or functions of alliances were not present in the
Egypticui-Soviet relationship. There was no augmentation of
power by both parties; there was no clear delineation of,
or movement toward, common vital interests or objectives;
there was no provision for collective or unilateral inter-
vention on behalf of either partner if the security of the
other was threatened.
Had Egypt realized that the relationship was not an
alliance, but a rational, commercial agreement, then she
could have better predicted Russian response to her requests
and problems. The vital interests of Egypt in the Middle
East are certainly not vital to the Soviet Union. Conversely,
the vital interests of Russia in the Middle East and in the
world are certainly not vital to Egypt. If both parties had
realized that the partnership — in spite of the Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation — was that of a patron and client,
then the objectives and goals of each party would have been
more clear and made a great deal more sense in that context.
The most important lesson that can be learned from the
Egyptian-Russian experience is that nations must analyze and
then understand exactly what constitutes the basis of their
relationships with other countries. They must assess whether
that relationship is an alliance, a commercial agreement, a
diplomatic agreement, or a patron-client relationship. Only
then can negotiation and interaction between countries be put
into proper perspective and analyzed correctly and objectively,
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Conversely/ one of the lessons that should have been
learned by now by the United States is that the US has the
opportunity to move back into the Middle East. United States
policy makers must first decide what kind of relationship the
United States wants with Mideast countries and then act
accordingly. There is definitely room for both superpowers
in the Middle East without turning the area into a confronta-
tion arena. The United States must decide on a long range
course of action and then take positive steps to move in a
direction that will achieve her goals. The United States
must abandon incrementalism and moralizing and adopt a far
sighted, pragmatic approach to the Middle East if she wants
to be a forceful influence in this critical area of the world.
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